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The rate of home ownership in the US had remained around 65% since the end of 
the Second World War.    Between 1994 and 2006 the rate of home ownership climbed to 
69%.  In 2006, the combined assets of the top 5 bank holding companies were $6 trillion.  
Between 2007 and 2009 almost $2 trillion of bank assets evaporated as widespread 
mortgage defaults triggered a crisis.  The pressing question is why were so many bad 
loans originated in the first place and what induced firms and investors to hold them?  
The primary mortgage market is intensely regulated and the secondary market is 
dominated by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).  Therefore it is important to 
examine the regulatory incentives to originate risky mortgages.   
 
This dissertation looks at influence of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA, 
1977) and the GSEs to originate and hold different kinds of mortgages.  Chapter One 
looks at the how the patterns of origination change for institutions subject to the CRA at 
the time of a merger.  Chapter Three estimates the propensity of lenders to retain or sell 
their mortgages to GSEs and private institutions.  Chapter Two links Chapters One and 
Three by examining the effect of the CRA on securitization.  The research shows that 
institutions subject to the CRA lower their rates of denial and securitize more assets when 
they plan to merge and are under community group pressure.  The research also reveals 
that the GSEs faced more competition after 2003 and as a result may have lowered their 




Chapter Two shows that investors accepted loans originated in response to CRA 
pressure without requiring a higher proportion of credit guarantees.  This means that 
market participants may not have been fully cognizant of how the riskiness of mortgages 
changed in response to CRA pressure. 
 
While many questions about the roots of the financial crisis are still to be 
answered, the results presented in this paper indicate that regulation played a significant 
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 In 2007 a wave of defaults on subprime loans left experts and laypersons 
wondering what would induce a sophisticated financial market to create and hold 
mortgages that gave every impression of being likely to default.  There are many theories 
about possible reasons.  This dissertation contends that banks were induced to originate 
risky loans to meet the requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and that 
the appetite of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) for risky loans lowered the cost 
of origination to all institutions.   
 
 This dissertation will establish that the CRA influenced the origination patterns of 
banks under community group pressure in the year preceding a merger.  Previous studies 
that looked at delays in the merger process and the profitability of banks with high CRA 
scores miss the strategic behavior that banks engage in to avoid delays due to merger 
protests.  The research presented in Chapter One finds that the CRA is responsible for the 
origination of at least an additional $114bn and possibly as much an additional $983.3bn 
worth of loans between 2001 and 2006, depending on how many times the institutions 
under community group pressure merged.  Banks get CRA credit for originating and 
purchasing, but not for holding, loans to lower income households in their community.  
Chapter One leaves the question of what banks did with the originated CRA loans 
unanswered.  Chapter Two picks up this thread and presents evidence that banks were 
able to securitize around a quarter of the loans originated for CRA purposes in the year 
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preceding a merger.  The findings presented in Chapter Three reveal that lending 
standards, as measured the by ratio of the loan amount to income, were higher for private 
purchasers than for GSEs. 
 
 The three chapters address the roots of the financial crisis by exploring the supply 
of and demand for risky mortgages.  The findings suggest that government regulation 
influenced both sides of the market and therefore had a profound influence on the 
quantity of risky loans in the financial market.  The CRA alone could account for the 
origination of as many as $983.3bn CRA mortgages.  The lower bound on CRA related 
mortgages is $141bn, which is still economically significant.  The panel regression in 
Chapter Two estimates that banks securitize $260 for every $1,000 worth of acquired 
assets when they face a CRA exam the quarter before a merger.  Chapters One and Two 
together show that banks change their lending practices when they are both merging and 
under CRA pressure and that they do not hold many of the loans they originate for CRA 
purposes.   
 
Chapter Three presents evidence that the GSEs are buying many of the risky 
mortgages that banks are originating.  Banks originate low and moderate-income (LMI) 
loans to meet the requirements of the CRA and GSEs purchase LMI loans to fulfill their 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) goals.   As the loan amount to 
income value on a loan application rises it becomes more likely to end up on the balance 
sheet of Fannie Mae than any other entity.  The data presented in Chapter Three show 
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that although GSEs were privately owned institutions before 2007, non-market related 
forces drive their performance.  The 2003 surge in Fannie Mae purchases cannot be 
linked to any observables in the applicant pool. The three chapters together present a 
picture of the creation and flow of risky mortgages through the financial system. The 
results show that from origination to purchase on the secondary market, regulation plays 







THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND HOME- 
LOAN ORIGINATION: THE MERGER PROCESS AS A DISCIPLINING 





In wake of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, the Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA) has attracted defenders and detractors alike.  The strongest defense of the 
CRA is the fact that a majority of subprime loans were originated by independent 
mortgage companies, that are not subject to the provisions of the CRA (Yellen, 2008).  
Chapter Three will deal with the incentives for all primary lenders to originate risky loans 
by GSEs. This chapter looks at origination data for both mortgage companies and banks, 
but I must stress that the comparison is not an exercise in accounting for subprime loans 
by source.   
 
The implications of the risk undertaken by banks differ from that of mortgage 
companies with respect to macroeconomic stability.  That is why the focus of the 
research presented here is to understand through what channels the CRA exerts its 
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influence on bank lending and the changes in lending it elicits.   Specifically, I examine 
the merger process and the role of community groups in that process.  A bank is required 
to fulfill the provisions of the CRA in order to merge, and community groups have the 
right to protest a merger.  The merger process is therefore an interesting theater in which 
to observe how the interaction between banks and community groups precipitates 
changes in lending practices.  The “community” to which the provisions of the CRA refer 
is defined geographically.  However many protests to mergers are on the basis of racial, 
not spatial, discrimination.   
 
Using a panel of 162 banks, I examine how denials as a percentage of applications 
for black applicants, white applicants and for applicants who conceal their race and 
ethnicity respond to mergers, protests and community group pledges.  Unlike previous 
research in this field, I am able to observe the assessment areas and compare lending 
within the assessment area to lending outside to determine to what extent the CRA leads 
to localized changes or to a relaxation of overall lending standards.  I indicate the 
presence of community group pressure with a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a bank 
has ever had to pledge to increase its CRA lending to a community group.  The 
origination of refinance loans is also examined to get an indication of how the CRA 
influences the origination of risky mortgage products. 
 
I find that merging banks that are under pressure from community groups 
decrease the percentage of denials to black and white applicants as well as to low and 
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moderate-income (LMI) households within their assessment areas.  This change in 
lending is overwhelmingly limited to the assessment area.  Black denials decline by 10% 
if a bank is merging and under community group pressure.  White denials decline by 
2.3% under the same conditions.  I find that banks under community group pressure wait 
until they want to merge to change their lending.  There was no indication in the data that 
banks “recycled” existing CRA loans by purchasing as opposed to originating new loans.  
The origination of refinance loans increases by 4.3% if a bank under community group 
pressure is planning to merge.  In addition to this, banks appear to satisfy the terms of      
their current CRA lending pledges to community groups by originating refinance loans.  
Banks who make CRA pledges increase their origination of refinance loans by 5% if they 
have made a CRA pledge in the current year.  The interaction between the merger process 
and community groups resulted in the origination of an additional $15.7 bn. worth of 
loans to black applicants, $40.3 bn. worth of loan to white applicants and $85 bn. of 
refinance loans, at the very least1. The maximum estimate is $94 bn. worth of loans to 
black applicants, $242 bn. worth of loans to white applicants and $647 bn. of refinance 






                                                
1 This estimate is based on the average loan amount for each category of lending between 2001 and 2006, an estimate of 350 banks 
that are under community group pressure (Silver and Brown, 2007) and at least 1 merger per bank during the 6 year period in question 
for the minimum and 6 mergers for the maximum amount.   
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1. 1  The Regulatory Environment  
 
1.1.1  The Community Reinvestment Act: History and Enforcement 
 
The CRA was passed in 1977.  The stated intention of the Act was to encourage 
lending institutions to increase lending to their communities.  The passage of the CRA 
was a response to a pattern of bank lending activity known as redlining.  Community 
activists in Chicago in the 1960’s are credited with coining the term “redlining”.  The 
term refers to the practice of banks to avoid lending to poor and declining neighborhoods.  
This practice is arguably a relic of the stringent standards set by the federally funded 
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), established in 1933 as part of the New Deal.  
Given that HOLC loans ceased in 1935, long before the passage of the CRA, this 
contention is unlikely to be true. The law requires that lending be undertaken in a safe 
and sound manner.  
 
The provisions of the CRA were tightened throughout the 1990’s.  Before 1995, 
banks could earn good ratings by documenting their efforts to lend to low and moderate-
income households.  After 1995, banks were required to report their lending activities 
within the assessment areas.  Although no explicit benchmarks were provided, lending 
could be compared across institutions and to previous assessments.    The changes made 
in 1995 were believed to be so burdensome that in 2005 the asset size requirement for a 
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large bank assessment was raised from $250 million for unaffiliated banks2 to $1 billion.  
Banks with assets exceeding $250million and less than $1billion were the made subject 
to requirements that were less burdensome than those on large banks (see below).    
 
As a consequence of the CRA, banks are subject to routine assessments and are 
assigned ratings based upon the extent to which they “met the needs of their assessment 
area”. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) assesses national banks.  
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) assesses thrifts and Savings and Loans.    The 
Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) assesses state chartered banks.  The FDIC assesses non-
national banks and banks that are not state chartered with federal deposits insurance.  
Assessments are usually conducted every 2-3 years.  The regulators are required to 
consider public comments when ratings are assigned and when rendering a decision on a 
merger application.  The four possible ratings are:  Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to 
Improve, and Substantial Non-Compliance.  A rating of at least satisfactory was required 
if the bank’s application for ”a new deposit facility” was to be approved by the 
regulators.  A “new deposit facility” can be a new branch, a merger, or an acquisition.  
The Act therefore influences banks’ lending choices by potentially limiting their ability to 
expand.  All depository institutions are subject to the provisions of the Act, including 
wholesale and business banks.   Wholesale and business banks are assessed according to 
the extent of their community development lending.    
 
                                                
2 A threshold of $1billion dollars was set for “conglomerated” banking institutions, presumably to deter the practice of creating 
separate corporate identities to avoid the provisions of the CRA.  (Federal Register, Vo. 60, no. 86, 1995 page 22178) 
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The tests differ depending on the size of the bank.  Banks are classified as small, 
intermediate-sized and large.  Small banks have assets valued at less than $250 million.  
Intermediate-sized bank have assets exceeding $250 million, but less than $1billion.  
Large banks have assets that exceed $1billion.  Table 3 on page 21 summarizes the 
frequency of examination types and scores.   Small banks are assessed on 5 performance 
standards.  These standards are: (1) the loan to deposit ratio (2) percentage of credit 
extended within the assessment area (3) credit extended to low and moderate-income3 
(LMI) borrowers and small businesses and farmers (4) the geographic distribution of 
loans and (5) actions taken in response to written complaints.  Small banks are exempt 
from the community investment and service requirements.  The intermediate-sized bank 
tests were introduced as part of the 2005 reform.  Before 2005 banks whose assets fell 
within this asset range were subject to the same tests as large banks.  Intermediate-sized 
banks are subject to a lending test similar to the one to which small banks are subject to.  
In addition to the lending test, the community development investments and services of 
intermediate banks are subject to community development tests.  (CRA 101, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco)  Large banks are subject to 3 tests: a lending test, a 
service test and an investment test. The investment test involves an examination of the 
contribution of banks to affordable housing, community services and economic activity in 
LMI neighborhoods.   
 
                                                
3 Low and moderate income is defined as 50% or less and between 50% and 80% of the median household income for the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) respectively. 
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The lending test is the most important component of the assessment.    Depending 
on the nature of a bank’s operations, the proportion of loans by value and volume to 
small businesses, small farms or loans to moderate and low-income households are 
assessed. The values of these proportions are reported, but there are no explicit evaluation 
benchmarks. The proportion of bank lending to LMI households is compared the size of 
the LMI population in the assessment area and to the lending activity of banks with 
similar size and assessment areas. A bank with an outstanding lending test can never 
receive an overall rating that is less than satisfactory, regardless of how poorly it may 
score on the other tests. The service test establishes whether or not there are enough 
branches and ATMs to service the community as well as the innovativeness and ambition 
of the bank’s community development services.  Examples of community development 
services include technical assistance to non-profit organizations, whose primary focus is 
community development, serving on the board of an organization that furthers affordable 
housing goals, and developing financial educational programs for LMI individuals.   For 
large banks, the lending test accounts for 50% of the CRA rating, while the investment 
and service tests each account for 25% of the rating. Several revisions have been made to 











The Regulatory History of the CRA 
Year Regulation Changes Made to CRA 
1977 CRA                   - 
1989 Federal Institutions Recovery, 
Reform and Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA) 
Required the public disclosure of CRA scores 
and reports 
1992 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial 
Soundness and Safety Act 
Required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
purchase and securitize mortgages 
1994 Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act 
Relaxed restrictions on interstate banking and 
required banks applying for in-state branches to 
have at least a satisfactory CRA rating  
1995 Changes to the Code of Federal 
Regulations 
Required CRA examinations to be more 
“performance” and less “procedure” oriented.  
Effectively made CRA examinations more 
stringent. 
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Repealed the Glass-Steagall Act (1933), 
thereby permitting commercial banks to offer 
investment banking services and insurance 
products to its clients.  All commercial banks 
applying to expand the range of products on 
offer had to be CRA compliant.  Required 
banks to disclose the terms of all their 
agreements with community groups.    
2005 Small Bank Regulatory Relief Code 
of Federal Regulations 
Less frequent and stringent exam for bank with 







In 1989, CRA ratings and reports were made public (see Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989).  In 1995, the standards of compliance 
were tightened.  Before the changes of 1995, banks could satisfy the provisions of the 
CRA by presenting their documented efforts to increase lending to the community.  After 
the 1995 tightening, banks were assessed on the basis of their ratio of lending within the 
“assessment area” to lending outside that area (See below). The regulatory agency that 
oversees a particular bank administers the assessment.  An assessment is conducted 
approximately every 3 years.   In 1999, in response to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act4, the 
CRA was expanded to require banks to be CRA-compliant if they desired to engage in 
investment banking and insurance.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also required banks to 
disclose written agreements between depository institutions and non-governmental 
groups in connection with the CRA (See FRB regulation G).   
 
The CRA requires that an assessment area must consist of whole “geographies” 
and/or political divisions.  This means it is a set of entire census tracts, the assessment 
area cannot include only a portion of a census tract. (CRA §228.41 (a) through (e))  The 
assessment area must include the census tracts in which its main office, branches and 
deposit taking ATMs are located.  In addition to these tracts, a bank must include the 
tracts in which it has originated a “substantial portion” of its loans.  Section 228 permits 
banks to adjust the boundaries of their assessment areas to reflect the area which they be” 
reasonably expected to serve.” Banks are therefore permitted to exclude portions of the 
                                                
4 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act by allowing the same institution to engage in banking, 
investment banking and insurance provisions 
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cities and towns in which they have branches located.  Census tracts with low median 
income relative to the MSA may not be “arbitrarily omitted” if they are adjacent to the 
bank’s assessment area. The larger the bank, the less likely it will be permitted to omit an 
LMI tract. (CRA §228.41 (e)(3))  Banks define their assessment area, within the 
provisions of the CRA, to maximize their rating5.   Banks seek to include tracts into their 
assessment area if it will improve their record of lending within the assessment area.  In 
order to do this they must document their growth history and plans within the area. 6   
The fact that banks have some say in selecting their assessment areas makes the 
assessment area itself endogenous.  However, it should be noted that this flexibility is 
limited.  Although banks have the freedom to include census tracts in their assessment 
areas, it is costly for a bank to omit a census tract from their assessment area if it is in 
close geographic proximity to the tracts within the assessment area. (CRA §228.41 (e)(3))  









                                                





When a Loan Falls within an Assessment Area 





A purchased or originated loan to purchase a 




A purchased or originated loan to purchase a 
property located in a poor census tract adjacent to at 
least one census tract where the bank has a branch 
or originates at least 10% of its loans. 
  The larger 
the bank, the 
more likely 
the loan falls 
within the 
banks AA 
A purchased or originated loan to purchase a 
property located in a census tract where the bank 
originates at least 10% of its loans. 
√ 
  
A purchased or originated loan to purchase a 
property located in a census tract where the bank 
neither has a branch nor originates many loans. 
  Only if the 
bank has 
made a case 
to include the 
tract in its 
AA 
†  AA denotes assessment area. 
 
Data collected under the provision of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) and comments from the community are the basis for assessment.   Under the 
provisions of the HMDA, a bank must submit loan application registers (LAR) and CRA 
disclosure records to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
every calendar year.  Bank lending data collected under the HMDA is published on the 
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FFIEC website.  Community groups and aggrieved borrowers are able to review a bank’s 
lending history and submit comments. The CRA gives individuals and community groups 
the right to take action against banks that are not adequately serving the needs of the 
community.   Such action usually takes the form of written complaints to the bank or 
regulatory agency.  These complaints sometimes result in a lower CRA rating, a delay in 
the merger process or the denial of a merger application.   
 
In this chapter and the next, we will turn our attention to one type of bank 
expansion: mergers and acquisitions.  Branching has not been addressed because there is 
no evidence that community groups protest branch openings.  Given that more than 93% 
of banks have the satisfactory score necessary to open new branches and that branch 
openings are seldom, if ever, protested, it is unlikely that annual originations will be 
discernibly responsive to branching. 
 
1.1.2 The Bank Merger Process 
 
The parties to a bank merger are required to submit form S-4 to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission if both or all banks involved have at least a satisfactory CRA 
score.   If at least one party to the merger has a Needs to Improve or a Substantial 
Noncompliance score the bank will either wait until the next assessment or it will file an 
appeal to the bank regulator.  Applications by banks with only one subsidiary with a less 
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than satisfactory score have been denied7.  In the 2001 case of Wesbanco, the bank met 
with community members to draft a plan of community investment.   Due to these efforts, 
the FDIC agreed to alter the score.  (Squires,2003).   The bank merger process is lengthy, 
sometimes taking 6 to 9 months.  Both the bank regulator and the Department of Justice 
review the competitive aspects of the bank merger and the state bank regulator may 
appeal the anti-trust finding.   Public notice of the merger is given and the community is 
invited to submit comments to request hearings.  At this stage community groups are 
given donations and lending pledges by banks.  A 2007 National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) report states that since 1977, 466 CRA agreements have 
been signed and $4.5 trillion has been pledged to LMI neighborhoods.  (NCRC, 2007)  
The regulator will then examine the evidence and make a decision. (Smith and Biddle, 
2005)  FOIA applications to the FDIC, FRB and OCC reveal that between 2001 and 2007 
less than 2% of merger applications were declined or withdrawn. 
 
1.1.3  The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and 
the Truth in Lending Act 
 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974 prohibits creditors from 
discriminating on the basis of gender, race, religion, nationality, and marital status.  It 
also outlaws discrimination on the basis of income originating from government 
subsidies8.  
                                                
7 See the section below for a discussion of the denial of a merger by First Interstate Bancsystem. 




The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act9 (HMDA) requires institutions that have at 
least one branch in an MSA to submit a Loan Application Register (LAR) to the FFIEC.   
The LAR is a record of the race, gender, ethnicity, income of each applicant together with 
the loan amount and action taken on the application.  The race and ethnicity is recorded 
for each applicant that applies face-to-face for a home loan.  If the applicant declines to 
disclose their race or ethnicity the bank employee is required to infer the applicant’s race 
from their name and to inform the applicant of the inference.  The HMDA requires that 
all loan application data collected be made public.  Parties who protest mergers and lodge 
complaints against banks at the time of CRA assessments often make use of the HMDA 
data. 
 
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968 was written to protect consumers by 
requiring that creditors disclosure all the terms and costs prior to the conclusion of loan 
agreement.  It should be noted that although both banks and mortgage companies are 
subject to the TILA, HMDA and ECOA, mortgage companies are not as closely 
monitored as banks.  While banks are subject to routine audits, the FTC examines 




                                                
9 The requirements for reporting are available at:  http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/regulationc2004.pdf 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1.2  Literature Review 
 
Contributions to our understanding of the CRA come from both legal and 
economic publications.  The existing economic publications offer an array of empirical 
regularities.  The legal literature provides anecdotal evidence and theoretical 
considerations.   
 
The economic literature offers two broad and critical insights.  First, the CRA had 
some effect on home loan origination by banks.  Second, mortgage companies, not 
institutions subject to the CRA, originated most of the risky loans involved in the sub 
prime meltdown.   We can divide the economic literature into 3 broad categories.  (1) 
papers that link loan origination under the CRA to some measure of performance, (2) 
papers that concentrate on the effect of the CRA on loan origination, (3) papers that 
explore the ways that banks can avoid the provisions of the CRA.  
 
Avery et. Al. (2005) used bank-level Call Report data and home purchase lending 
data and determined that the profitability of the largest 500 retail banks is statistically 
unresponsive to the amount of lending to LMI households.    A 2008 working paper by 
Laderman and Reid uses data that maps California home purchase loan origination 
activity to mortgage performance.  They compare the performance of loans originated by 
banks to loans originated by mortgage companies.  After accounting for an extensive 
array of borrower characteristics, type of lender and housing market control variables, 
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they find that loans within a bank’s assessment area are less likely to foreclose than loans 
outside the assessment area. Preliminary results indicate that mortgage companies are 
responsible for originating the majority of the high-risk, poor performing loans. However, 
the difference between the performance of mortgage company and bank-originated loans 
is substantially diminished when only low to moderate-income neighborhoods are 
examined.  No account is taken of who holds the loan and how the secondary market may 
lower the cost originating a risky loan.   
 
An alternative methodology is employed by Apgar and Duda (2003) to measure 
the effect of the 1995 tightening on loan origination.  In this paper, origination in 1993 is 
compared to origination in 2000.  For these 2 years, they compare the percentages of 
home loans devoted to LMI households within their assessment areas to the percentage 
outside of their assessment area.   They also compare the percentage of LMI home loans 
originated by banks to the percentage originated by mortgage companies.  They find that 
the origination of loans to LMI households is greatest for banks within their assessment 
areas.  However, they find a decline in assessment area lending by banks.  Apgar and 
Duda recommend that CRA assessments look at loans made outside of the assessment 
area.  There is evidence that the CRA increased home ownership by minorities in New 
York City in the 1990’s (Freeman and Hamilton 2002).  Freeman and Hamilton estimate 
a reduced-form logistic model for home-ownership for white New York City residents.  
They then enter the observable characteristics of for black residents into the model and 
use the difference between the predicted and observed values to estimate the proportion 
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of the difference in home ownership that is explained by observed characteristics.  The 
exercise is repeated for the 1991, 1993, 1996 and 1999 data.  Freeman and Hamilton find 
that the proportion of the difference in homeownership that is explained by observed 
characteristics rose steadily from 50% in 1991 to 63.7% in 1999.  The paper provides 
“circumstantial evidence” that the regulatory changes in the 1990’s reduced 
discrimination in home purchase lending.   
 
Some studies indicate that the CRA has fallen short of its goals.  It is held that, 
due to vague performance benchmarks, some CRA scores appear inflated when compared 
to more objective benchmarks (Nesiba and Golz, 2002).   There is also speculation that 
banks are able to circumvent the requirements of the CRA by extensive use of telephonic 
and electronic applications, obscuring the race and ethnicity of applicants (Wyly and 
Holloway 2002).  Wyly and Holloway examine the cases where applicants declined to 
give their race and ethnicity.  They define the probability that there will be no racial 
information for an applicant as the conditional probability that an applicant will apply 
electronically and that the applicant will decline to disclose her race and ethnicity.  They 
estimate the probability that an applicant will obscure their race as a function of the racial 
profile of the census tract from where the application came and compare the predicted 
probabilities to the frequency of no racial information.   Wyly and Holloway find 
discrepancies between the predicted probability and actual frequency and attribute this 
phenomenon to the ability of banks to obscure their true rates of denial by employing 
telephonic and electronic applications.  
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Banks can also find relief from the CRA by selecting the OCC as their regulator 
instead of the FRB and FDIC. (Matasar and Pavelka, 1998).  Data on CRA assessments 
between 1990 and 1996 indicated that historically OCC was the most lenient of all 
regulators.  A time series comparison showed that regulators were increasingly giving a 
higher proportion of outstanding scores.  The comparison suggested that the difference in 
the mean score given by each agency was dwindling over time.  Matasar and Pavelka 
interpret the relative frequency of scores over time to indicate a regime of competitive 
laxity among regulatory agencies.   
 
The legal literature can be divided into two broad, but by no means mutually 
exclusive sub-categories.  Studies regarding the empowerment of community groups and 
their influence and research focused upon the unintended distortions to both the industrial 
organization of lending and to bank portfolios.  The influence that community groups 
derive from the Act is relevant to our discussion to the extent that it motivates the 
incentive of banks to comply with the provisions of the Act. 
 
In practice, a CRA rating of Satisfactory or Outstanding serves to reduce the 
probability of community group resistance to bank mergers and other expansions.  Banks 
with Satisfactory ratings have been subject to merger delays until the completion of a 
scheduled examination (see First Union 1989, Cowell and Hagler 1992).   Precedent 
indicates that a bank’s ability to merge is only as strong as its weakest subsidiary.   For 
example, the Federal Reserve Board rejected the application of First Interstate 
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BancSystem to acquire Commerce BancShares on CRA grounds.  Despite the 
Satisfactory ratings of the First Interstate subsidiaries, a subsidiary representing less than 
2% of First Interstate’s assets had failed to extend credit on the North Cheyenne Indian 
Reservation that fell within its assessment area.    
 
Gramm (2002) rejects the hypothesis of benevolently motivated CRA protests in 
favor of rent-seeking motivations based on his finding that the probability of a CRA 
protest is increasing with respect to the asset size of the bank.  Gramm estimates that the 
duration of merger applications is reduced by two days if the bank is rated Outstanding 
instead of Satisfactory.  Gramm contends that 2 days are a long time in the merger 
process because deals are sensitive to delays.  However, if a bank merger can take up to 9 
months, 2 days does not appear to be a meaningful delay.  Macey and Miller state that 
banks have learned to cope with the threat of potential community group action by 
creating funds for community lending that are not pledged to any particular group, 
preventing the situation where upon satisfying one group, action is then brought by 
another group.  Often these pledges are not fulfilled once the merger has been approved.   
 
Much of the literature in the early 1990’s addresses the conflict between the 
assumptions underlying the CRA and the changing structure of the banking industry.  
While regulation permitted banks to expand across state borders, the CRA was drafted on 
the assumption that banking should be local (Macey & Miller, 1993).  The result was an 
environment where “financial institutions walk a tightrope between the demands for 
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increased CRA efforts and the need to consolidate the industry though mergers.” (Cowell 
and Hagler, 1992) 
 
Apart from potentially distorting bank consolidation, the Act encouraged risky 
behavior on the part of banks. Banks are penalized with poor CRA scores for investing 
too heavily in reserves and for diversifying beyond their assessment area.   For example, 
AmericanWest Bank of Washington was lauded in its 2004 report for a 99% loan-to-
deposit ratio, Woodford State Bank of Wisconsin exhibited a “reasonable” loan to deposit 
ratio of 86% in the same year.   Cambridge State Bank received a Substantial 
Noncompliance rating for its “ultraconservative” lending practice of investing “too 
heavily in government bonds.”  (Macey and Miller 1993)  The Act also encourages the 
use of “flexible lending practices.”  Flexibility in this context means low down payment 
mortgages, a lowering of credit standards and a wide range of risky mortgage products. 
(Liebowitz, 2008)  
 
This paper is unique in that it uses bank level panel data that is not restricted to 
any particular state or city.   The results are therefore more general.  This is also the first 
study to use the actual assessment areas instead of an instrument, such as branch location.  
Furthermore, the focus of this paper is how the CRA operates through the merger 
process.  New branch openings are seldom protested, and delays to mergers are costly 
and community groups have a forum to complain.  This study is distinct from Gramm’s 
2002 study because the LAR data provide a way to observe strategic loan origination on 
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the part of the bank so that they may avoid protests and delays.  Data on community 
lending pledges are also employed to provide a more complete picture of how the 
interaction between community groups and banks influences lending. 
 
 
1.3   Sample Selection and Data Summary 
 
The CRA database is a record of the assessment dates, exam method and CRA 
scores for the 17,540 banks subject CRA assessments.   A random sample of 200 bank 
identification numbers and regulator codes10 was taken from the CRA ratings database.  
To this random sample 20 large banks were added to produce a sample that accounts for 
the bulk of the deposits in the US.  The annual electronic record of the many census tracts 
that comprise the assessment area is available for each bank that submits a report of 
agricultural and small businesses lending to the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examinations Council (FFIEC)11.  In order to create a sample of banks for which the 
assessment areas are observable every year, the randomly selected bank identification 
numbers were matched to those banks that submitted reports of CRA lending in 2002.  
This matching process eliminated 35 banks from the sample.   In order to remain in the 
sample, the banks with observable assessment areas also had to submit their home 
lending application data (their LAR’s) each year, beginning in 2001 and ending in 2006.  
This left 162 banks in the sample.   
                                                
10 The combination of a bank identification number (ID) and regulator number produces a unique record.  For example there can be 2 
banks with the ID 12345, but they will have different regulators. 




A random sample of 50 2002 HMDA reporting institutions with “Mortgage 
Company” as part of their name was selected.  To remain in the sample, Lexis Nexis had 
to have at least one record of a SEC filing by the mortgage company or its parent 
company.  The inclusion of mortgage companies in the sample increased the number of 
institutions in the sample by 41.  Collectively they submitted on average 6.2 million 
applications per year during the window of examination.  Together, the 41 mortgage 
companies typically submit twice as many applications as the banks12.  
 
Merger data for the banks were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act 
from the FRB and FDIC, from the Weekly Reports at the OCC website and the merger 
search engine on the OTS website.  Merger data for the mortgage companies were 
obtained from searching Lexis Nexis for merger related SEC filings.13  Merger protest 
data was obtained from the released merger decision documents from the respective 
regulators websites and from the archives of community group websites.  I obtained the 
dollar -value of community lending pledges from a report by the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition.  Banks are under no legal obligation to honor these pledges but 
pledges are potentially a powerful instrument for community group pressure.  Using 
observed protests to mergers as an instrument for community group pressure is 
problematic because banks can potentially avoid merger protests by coming to 
agreements with community groups.  The ability of banks to negotiate with community 
                                                
12 Countrywide alone accounts for approximately 2 million applications per annum. 
13 Specifically forms DEF 14C, 40-AF-M, DEFM 14A, DEFM 14C, N-14, PRE 14A, PRE 14C, PREM 14A, PREM 14C 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groups makes pledges a superior instrument of community group pressure.  Figure1.1 
illustrates the sample generation process.  Coalition.  The use of pledges or dummy 
variables indicating whether or not the bank has made a pledge, as an independent 
variable is potentially problematic.  Banks that are pressured into making pledges may 
have higher rates of denial for LMI and minority applicants.  Therefore the direction of 
causation between denial rates and pledges is uncertain.   
 
The 162 banks in the sample merged 250 times between 2001 and 2006.  51 of 
these mergers were protested.  Merging institutions are overrepresented in the sample, 
2,051 mergers were recorded for the universe of 12,700 banks in the country between 
2001 and 2006.   This is due to the inclusion of 20 large banks in the sample.   The 41 
mortgage companies merged 14 times over the sample period.  The banks in the sample 
pledged $3.2 trillion14 of CRA lending to community groups.  All banks between 1977 
and 2007 pledged $4.5 trillion of CRA lending.   Banks are  
                                                
14 Total home lending by the banks in the sample over the sample period was $1,727 trillion, 53% of total pledges.  
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Figure 1.1: Sample Generation 
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Three hundred and eighty-two CRA assessments were conducted for sampled 
banks between 2001 and 2006.  Those assessments awarded 107 scores of Outstanding , 
271 Satisfactory and 1 Needs to Improve.  The average rating was 1.72 over the sample 
period.  A comparison of the CRA data for the sample and the population is summarized 
in Table 1.3 below. 
TABLE 1.3 
Comparison of Sample and Population CRA Data 2001-2006 
Variable Population Sample 
Number of Banks 9,377 162 
Number of Assessments 13,334 382 
Average Score 1.89 1.72 
Percentage Outstanding Scores 11% 28% 
Percentage Satisfactory Scores 86% 71.2% 
Percentage Needs to Improve Scores 3% 0.002% 
Percentage Substantial Noncompliance Scores 0.009% 0% 
Percentage Large Bank Assessments 23% 89% 
Percentage Intermediate Bank Assessments 4% 4% 
Percentage Small Bank Assessments† 70% 6% 
Mean Asset Size ($ 000’s) 1,492,343 12,958,093 
   
†  The remainder of the assessments were wholesale and special purpose bank types of assessment. 
 
Table 1.3 reveals the extent to which large banks have been oversampled.  This is 
appropriate for this study because large banks are more likely to be under community 




Table A1 of Appendix A shows the summary statistics for banks and Table A2 
shows the summary statistics for mortgage companies.  On average banks purchase15 
20% of the new loans on their balance sheet and deny 20% of their applications.  They 
deny 30% of the applications within their assessment area16.  The denial rate for black 
applicants is approximately 22% both within and outside of the assessment area.  The 
average bank in the sample gets 12,229 applications from whites every year and denies 
10% of these both within and outside of its assessment area.  Figure 1.2 shows denials as 
a percentage of applications by race.   
 
FIGURE 1.2 
Total, Assessment Area and Non-Assessment Area Denial Rates by Race 
 
Note:  AA denotes assessment are 
                                                
15 Purchased loans are loans originated by other institutions 
16 Rate of denial is a fraction of (originations+purchases) minus purchases. 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Banks originate only 52% of the applications they receive from LMI households.  
Loans to LMI applicants are only available for 2005 and 2006, this is when the HMDA 
data began to record median census tract income.  51% of the applications banks receive 
are for refinance loans.   
 
Table A2 of Appendix A contains the summary statistics for mortgage companies.  
The average mortgage company in the sample receives 5 times as many applications as 
the average bank.  22% of new loans on the average mortgage company’s balance sheet 
are purchased.  The denial rate of loans to white applicants is about 16% and the denial 
rate on black applications is about 22%.  55% of the loans mortgage companies originate 
are refinance loans.    The variables used in the panel estimation are tabulated and defined 
below in Table 1.4.  Applications by LMI households are only observed in 2005 and 
2006.  Panel estimation is therefore impractical for the origination of loans to LMI 
households.  In the case of applications by LMI households, the change in the rate of 
origination between 2005 and 2006 is the dependent variable so that bank specific effects 













List of Variables and Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Explanatory Variables 
Merger A dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution merges or acquires another institution 
in the current year. 
Merger Protest A dummy variable equal to 1 if any entity lodged an objection to a merger with the 
bank’s regulator. 
Pledge  A dummy variable to 1 during the current year if the institution pledged to a 
community group to expand CRA lending. 
Ever Pledge A dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution made any pledge to a community 




The interaction between these two variables is intended to control for merging banks 
under community group pressure. 
CRA Exam A dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution was subject to a CRA Exam during 
the current year. 
CRA Rating The CRA rating of the institution as of its last CRA exam. 
Dependent Variables 
Denial Rate The number of applications by members of a particular racial group that denied as a 
fraction of the total applications by members of the racial group. 
 
Change in LMI 
Originations as a 
Percentage of LMI 
Applications 
 
The difference between the percentage of loans to LMI applicants originated in 2006 
and the percentage of loans to LMI applicants (applicants with less than 80% of the 








The number of refinance loans either originated or purchased from other institutions 





1.4  Econometric Model 
 
A fixed-effects panel model is used to estimate the influence of CRA control 
variables and mergers on lending.  The panel is unbalanced and short, having only 6 
years and 142 institutions.  
 
The fixed effects model to be estimated is generally written as: 
€ 
yit = Χ it




α i denotes the fixed effect, or conditional mean for the “group”.  In this 
case the i subscript denotes the identification number of the banks.  Institutions will most 
certainly differ in the extent to which they originate home loans as opposed to small 
business and agricultural loans.  They will also differ with respect to their propensity for 
risk according to the form of ownership. The individual fixed-effects coefficients will 
capture institution specific effects and therefore eliminate one source of omitted variable 
bias.  The vector product 
€ 
Χ it
' β  for this paper denotes a set of CRA control variables and 




' β = β1 + β2(everpledge*merger(t +1))it + β3(everpledge) + β4 (merger(t))
+β5(merger(t +1))it + β6(MergerProtest)it + β7(CRAExam)it + β8(CRARating)it
   (2) 
 









2 ≥ 0 
Firms that merge in the next period should change some of their lending 







The effect of community group pressure on lending should be more 




6 ≠ 0 
Banks higher denial and lower origination rates should invite CRA 
protests.  When the dependent variable is the rate of denial, the 
occurrence of a protest predicts a higher rate of denial.  When the 
dependent variable is the rate of origination, the occurrence of a protest 




7 ≥ 0 
Banks undergoing a CRA assessment during the current year should 





8 ≥ 0 
Banks with lower numeric (i.e. better) scores should have on average 
fewer denials and more originations in the lending categories examined. 
 
The fixed effects panel model is estimated using the method of OLS.  Year fixed-
effects are also tested for significance.   
 
 
1.5  Empirical Investigation: Mergers and the CRA 
 
A CRA score of at least satisfactory is needed only when a bank wants to expand. 
This paper selects mergers to identify the effect of the CRA on lending because most 
banks already have the at least the satisfactory rating needed to expand and therefore the 
enforcement mechanism of the CRA is through protests and complaints.  New branching 
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applications are rarely protested and therefore banks are much more likely to strategically 
change lending patterns around the time of a merger.  Earning at least a satisfactory score 
gives banks the option to expand in the future and therefore a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the bank was subject to a CRA exam is included.  The other explanatory 
variables are dummies for whether a merge was protested and whether the bank made a 
pledge to community groups to increase their lending to disadvantaged groups.   
 
I use 3 margins of comparison to test the effects of mergers on lending.  First I use 
the occurrence of mergers in the current year as a treatment effect and compare merging 
banks vs. non-merging banks.  This comparison identifies changes in lending due to the 
CRA.  It is in fact testing a joint hypothesis:  the effect of merging on lending and the 
effect of the CRA on lending.  Banks may change their lending patterns in response to a 
merger because the behavior of outgoing managers changes in anticipation of a merger.  
 
 In order to determine to what extent the change in lending may be 
attributed to the CRA, I use whether the institution is subject to the CRA as a treatment 
and compare merging banks to merging mortgage companies. I then compare the lending 
of merging banks within the assessment area to their lending of merging banks outside of 
the assessment area.   This is a test of whether the CRA leads to targeted changes in 
lending or to an overall decline in lending standards (Liebowitz, 2008).   The set of tests 





Empirical Test Overview 
Comparison Hypothesis Interpretation 




Coefficients on the dummy 
variable MERGE are 
significantly different from zero 
The CRA influences the kinds of 
lending undertaken by merging 
banks. 
Lending of Merging Banks  
vs.  
Lending of Merging Mortgage 
Companies 
 
The lending of mortgage 
companies is invariant to merger 
plans while the lending of banks 
is altered 
The changes in lending around 
the time of a merger are due to 
the CRA and not to agency costs 
Lending of Merging banks 
within the Assessment Area vs.  
Lending of Banks Outside of the 
Assessment Area 
The lending of merging banks 
should change both within and 
outside of the assessment area 
The CRA leads to a general 




The next question is to what kinds of lending do we turn our attention to in order 
to gauge the effects of the CRA?  The three key dimensions are: race, income and 
riskiness.  Many protests of bank mergers are lodged on the basis of racial discrimination.  
Therefore I compare total denials as a fraction of total applications for black applicants, 
white applicants and applicants that do not disclose their race.  At this juncture it is 
important to address the Wyly and Holloway (2002) result.  If banks deflate the rate of 
denial to black applicants by using telephonic applications we can test the robustness of 
these results by regressing of the proportion of applicants who do not disclose their race 
as a function of whether or not the institution plans to merge.  The CRA is written to 
encourage lending to LMI households, therefore the denial rate of loans to LMI 
households is also of interest.   
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The data can also contribute to our understanding of how and to what extent the 
CRA influenced “risky” lending.  The data set does not show what proportion of loans 
went into default, but from previous research (Gramlich, 2007) we know that refinance 
loans carry high default risk.  For banks and mortgage companies separately I regress a 
panel of each denial rate on an expansion dummy that is equal to 1 if the institutions is 
planning to merge.  For banks the denial rate is also regressed on a set of CRA variables.  
The CRA variables are listed in Table 1.4.  To see the influence of the CRA on risky 
lending I regress the percentage of originated refinance loans as a fraction of application 
for refinance loans in merger and CRA variables.   
 
 
1.6  Results 
 
The results are displayed in Appendix B.  Year fixed-effects were rejected for all 
panel regressions.  By comparing the results presented for banks in Tables B1 through B3 
to the results for mortgage companies presented in the first columns (a), (b) and (c) of 
Table B6 we can see that denial rates for black applicants, white applicants and 
applicants who do not disclose their race behave similarly in the presence of merger 
activity for both banks and mortgage companies.  However, the interaction between an 
upcoming merger and the instrument for community group pressure results in a reduction 
in denials to black applicants.  Table B1 column (c) shows that this result is particularly 
pronounced for black applicants within the assessment area.   Unless banks have the 
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power to select their assessment area to minimize denials to black applicants, a 
comparison between the rates of denial between black applicants inside and outside the 
assessment area as shown in columns (c) and (d) of Table B1 suggests that the effects of 
the CRA are limited to the assessment area and do not lead to an overall change in 
lending standards.  A merging bank under CRA pressure will decrease its denial rate of 
black applicants by 10.4% in the year before the merger is granted. A merging bank 
under CRA pressure will decrease its denial rate of black applicants by 2.3% in the year 
before the merger is granted.   The results from the CRA control variables are presented 
in Table 1.7.  It is problematic that the dummy variable Ever Pledge has an effect in the 
panel regressions.  Around 76% of the banks in the sample made a pledge before the 
sample period began and the fact that the dummy alone explains some variation not 
captured by the bank fixed effect suggests that there is some time dependence in the Ever 
Pledge dummy variable.  In Tables B1 and B2 the effects were more significant and 
larger in the pooled regressions for black and white denial rates respectively.  These 
higher and more significant coefficients for the pooled regressions are consistent with the 
hypothesis that some banks have higher average rates of denial than others.  In the panel 
regressions the bank fixed effect absorbs some of the power of the marginal effect of 









Inference Tests and Interpretation17 
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6 ≠ 0 
Protests explain 
higher rates of 
denial and lower 
origination 




7 ≥ 0 
Banks change 
their lending in 
anticipation of a 
CRA assessment 




8 ≥ 0 
Protests explain 
higher rates of 
denial and lower 
origination 





                                                
17 These results are for lending within the assessment area. 
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While the interaction between community group pressure and a merger in the next 
period leads to a reduction in the rate of denial of black applicants, and to limited extent, 
white applicants within the assessment area, Table B3 shows that this effect is not present 
for applicants who choose not to disclose their race.  This pattern of results could be due 
to the credit worthiness kind of applicants who apply telephonically and no not disclose 
their race. The percentage of loans to applicants who do not disclose their race as a 
fraction of total applications was regressed on the same CRA and merger variables used 
in Tables B1 through B3.   A possible interpretation of the negative coefficients on Ever 
Pledge for the denial rates of applicants who do not declare their race presented in 
columns (b) and (c) of Table B3 is that banks under community group pressure use 
electronic applications to avoid community group scrutiny. A regression of the number of 
loan application on parties that do not disclose their race on CRA and merger 
independent variables showed no evidence to suggest that banks were strategically 
utilizing channels that allow applicants to conceal their race and ethnicity. TableB4 
shows that the origination of loans to LMI applicants is responsive to the interaction 
between community group pressure and a future merger.  Column (b) of Table B4 
indicates that this effect is pronounced within the assessment area.  Bank under 
community group pressure will increase their origination of CRA loans by 4.3% when 
they are planning to burn.   
 
An examination of the coefficients of the Ever Pledge dummy in Tables A1 
through A3 offers a surprising result.  Banks who respond to community group pressure 
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by making pledges have higher rates of denial to black applicants, white applicants and to 
applicants who do not disclose their race.  This finding could be due to the fact that 
community groups exert more pressure on banks with higher rates of denial.  
Nevertheless, when interpreted in conjunction with the positive effect of the interaction 
between Ever Pledge and future mergers, it suggests an interesting strategy by 
pressurized banks.  That is: only respond to community group pressure when you are 
planning to merge.   Table A5 shows that banks that both face community group pressure 
and are merging in the next year originate more refinance loans within their assessment 
areas and fewer refinance loans outside their assessment area.  By comparing the 
coefficients on Ever Pledge and whether or not the bank made a pledge in the current 
year in Table B6 reveals that the origination of refinance loans is more responsive to 
current pledges than to past ones.  This suggests that banks fulfill their current pledges by 
temporarily increasing their originations of refinance loans.  The results in terms of the 













Summary of Empirical Test Results 
Comparison Hypothesis Results 





Coefficients on the dummy 
variable MERGE are 
significantly different from 
zero 
Merging is only important if the bank is 
under community group pressure 
 
Lending of Merging 
Banks  
vs.  




The lending of mortgage 
companies is invariant to 
merger plans while the 
lending of banks is altered 
 
Column (d) of Table B6 indicates that 
merging mortgage companies originate 
7.7% more refinance loans in the year 
before they merge.  Merging banks do 
not. Exhibit a similar pattern unless they 
are under community group pressure.  
Merging mortgage companies do not 
change the racial pattern of their 
originations, but merging banks do.  
(Tables B1-B3) 
 
Lending of Merging 
banks within the 
Assessment Area vs.  
Lending of Banks 
Outside of the 
Assessment Area 
The lending of merging banks 
should change both within and 
outside of the assessment area 
if the CRA leads to an overall 
change in lending standards. 
Lending within the assessment area is 
much more sensitive to mergers under 
CRA pressure than lending outside the 
assessment area.  Unless banks can vary 
their assessment areas freely every year, 
this indicates targeted changes as opposed 








I calculate the change in the total value of loans originated due to the interaction 
between banks and community groups at the time of a merger by using the average loan 
amount for white applicants, black applicants, applicants who do not disclose their race 
and refinance loans.  By using Ever Pledge as an indicator of community group pressure, 
the NCRC report indicates that there are 350 banks under community group pressure. If 
we assume that each of the 350 banks merged only once during the 6 year period, the 
interaction between the merger process and community groups resulted in the origination 
of at least an additional $15.7 bn. worth of loans to black applicants, $40.3 bn. worth of 
loan to white applicants and $85 bn. of refinance loans.   If we assume that each of the 
350 banks merged 6 times in 6 years, the maximum estimate is an additional $94.3 bn. 
worth of loans to black applicants, $242 bn. worth of loans to white applicants and $647 
bn. of refinance loans.  The banks under community group pressure in the sample merged 
an average of 3.2 times each between 2001 and 2006.   
 
 
1.7  Concluding Remarks 
 
The CRA influences bank lending by jointly constraining the merger process and 
giving community groups the right to protest.  With the exception of refinance loans, 
neither the merger process nor pledges to community groups alone can change patterns in 
origination.  The effect is largely limited to lending within the assessment area. This may 
be because the assessment area itself is endogenous and chosen by banks to maximize 
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their performance under the CRA.  However, the fact that changes in lending patterns are 
confined to the assessment area strengthens the result that changes in lending are due the 
CRA and that banks respond to CRA pressure not by lowering lending standards in 
general but by strategic lending.  The differential effect within and outside of the 
assessment area strengthen the case that changes in lending patterns are due to the CRA.  
The changes in lending by banks in anticipation of a merger are not explained by other 
merger related factors, otherwise we would see similar effects both for banks planning to 
merge that are not under pressure from community groups and for merging mortgage 
companies.  All of these differentials constitute persuasive circumstantial evidence that 
the CRA lead to changes in lending standards.    
 
The effects of the CRA do not appear to be negligible.  The banks under 
community group pressure are typically very large institutions that are required to 
originate many more qualifying loans to satisfy the requirements of the CRA.  If these 
banks merged 6 times in 6 year, the CRA could for account as many as $983.3bn 
additional loans in the system.  The lower bound of $141bn of CRA related loans is still 
economically significant.   
 
Banks get credit for originating and purchasing loans, but not for holding them.  
There still remains the question of what the banks do with the CRA loan they originate.  
Chapter Two explores the propensity to securitize CRA loans and Chapter Three looks at 
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THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND SECURITIZATION 




The fact that banks are given CRA credit for purchasing or originating community 
loans, but not for holding them has the potential to create perverse incentives.  If banks 
are not holding loans to maturity, they may lower standards in ways that may be unclear 
to buyers of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). This paper relates the timing of CRA 
exams to the bank’s securitization activities.  I find that the presence of a CRA 
examination does not significantly alter the propensity of a bank to securitize unless the 
bank is planning a merger.  
 
 I also find that the secondary market absorbs $260 in securitized assets for every 
$1,000 worth of assets acquired during the merger if the institution faces a CRA 
examination in the quarter before the merger.  There is strong circumstantial evidence to 
suggest that this change is due to the CRA exam.  Commercial banks that do not face a 
CRA exam in the quarter before a merger actually reduce the amount they securitize in 






2.1   The Community Reinvestment Act and Mergers 
 
The Act was passed in 1977.  The intention of the Act was to encourage lending 
institutions to serve their communities.  Banks had to undergo assessments and were 
assigned ratings18 based upon to extent to which they met the needs of their assessment 
area.  A rating of at least satisfactory was required if the bank’s application for a new 
deposit facility was to be approved by the regulators.  A new deposit facility refers to any 
new branch, merger or acquisition.  The Act therefore limits the ability of a lending 
institution to expand.  All depository institutions are subject to the provisions of the Act, 
including wholesale and business banks.   
 
Many revisions were made to the Act during its brief history.  In 1989, CRA 
ratings and reports were required to be public.  In 1995, the standards of compliance were 
tightened.  Banks were assessed on the basis of explicit proportions of lending within the 
assessment area to lending outside. The assessment consists of three components: the 
lending test, the service test and the investment test.   
 
These tests assess the extent to which the bank is lending, providing services for 
and investing in its community.  The proportion of loans by value and volume to small 
businesses, small farms and moderate to low-income households came under scrutiny.  
The values of these proportions are reported, however there are no transparent 
                                                
18 The four possible ratings are:  Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve and Substantial Non-Compliance. 
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benchmarks. What is clear is the importance of the lending test.  A bank with an 
outstanding lending test can never receive an overall rating that is less than satisfactory, 
regardless of how poorly it may score on the other tests. 
 
In 1999, in response to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act19, the CRA was expanded to 
require banks to be CRA compliant if they desired to engage in investment banking and 
insurance.  In 2005, less strict requirements were placed on small and intermediate 
banks20.   
 
The CRA conferred the right upon community groups to take action against banks 
that were not adequately serving the needs of the community.   
 
 
2.2   Literature Review 
 
Asset securitization is best defined as the “partial or complete segregation of a 
specific set of cash flows from a corporation’s other assets and the issuance of securities 
based on these cash flows.” (Iacobucci&Winter, 2005) Between 1986 and 2006, the 
initial apprehension present in asset securitization literature gave way to enthusiasm.   
 
 
                                                
19 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act19 allowed the same institution to engage in banking, investment banking and insurance provisions 
20 Initially, a small bank was defined as a bank with fewer than $1 billion worth of assets. 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2.2.1  Judgment Proofing 
 
Initially, there was a great deal of debate surrounding the potential for 
corporations to ”judgment proof” their assets through securitization.  (LoPucki, 1996)  
The “judgment proofing school” held that corporations could separate the ownership and 
the operation of assets through securitization.  When tort liability arose in the normal 
course of business, claims would be limited to the meager assets of the operating firm.  
 
Detractors of judgment proofing contended that the assets of a firm that engaged 
in securitization would not be diminished.  The firm would receive consideration equal to 
the present value of the future benefits generated by the asset and, unless the 
consideration was paid out to the shareholders, the ability of the firm to meet the claims 
of creditors would be unchanged.  (Schwarcz, 1999)  The growing propensity of firms to 
securitize assets that do not generate tort liabilities21 diverted intellectual energy from 
judgment proofing to efficiency gains. 
 
2.2.2  Tailoring Risk Exposure to Preference 
 
Asset securitization is held to facilitate a better match of risk bearing with risk 
preference (Berger&Benveniste, 1994).  In the event of liquidation of the originating 
firm, investors in securitized assets are protected because they have preferential claim to 
                                                
21 For instance, debt obligations.   
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specific assets.  In this respect asset securitization is similar to secured debt.   As the 
“partition22” between the assets and firms is stronger in the case of asset securitization, it 
is arguably superior to secured debt. Mortgage backed securities (MBS) advance the 
matching of security to both risk preference and investor specific information.  Investors 
in MBS are able to choose between general claims, interest only or principal only 
obligations. 
 
2.2.3  Hidden-Information 
 
The phenomenon of asset securitization is highly amenable to theories that 
assume asymmetric information.  The literature that analyzes the incentives to securitize 
that derive from asymmetric information falls into two categories:  theories of hidden-
information and theories of hidden-action.  (Iacobucci&Winter, 2005) 
 
Hidden-information theories differ in terms of whether there is an asymmetry of 
information on the non-securitized assets or the securitized assets of the firm.  They are 
similar in the respect that they rely upon “market forces to allocate claims to those 
investors who are best informed about returns.”   
 
  In the case of the asymmetric information about non-securitized assets, 
securitization is the means by which the securities market circumvents the lemons market 
                                                
22 The partition in this context is a legal one.  Securitization approximates a “true sale” of assets to a greater extent than the issuing of 




premium on claims to the pooled assets of the firm.  An asymmetry of information 
between inside and outside investors is assumed to exist.  The managers of high-quality 
firms securitize the assets about which investors are equally informed in order to signal 
the quality of the remaining assets.  This leads to securitization on the part of managers of 
lower quality firms, as the decision to not securitize would signal low quality assets.  
(Myers&Majluf, 1984)   
 
The latter hidden-information explanation assumes an asymmetry of information 
between different types of investors about the securitized assets of the firm.  The 
investors who specialize in information regarding one kind of asset are the investors most 
willing to accept a higher level of risk regarding the asset.   The firm securitizes this type 
of asset.  When specialized investors purchase subordinated tranches of these assets, they 
provide a quality assurance to other investors.  (Schwarcz, 2002)  In this case, firms will 
not use the services of ratings firms.  (Schwarcz, 1994) 
 
The hidden-information problem can also be overcome through the combination 
of securitization and the services of ratings firms.  (Iocabucci & Winter, 2005) In this 
case, firms with high-quality securitizable assets will signal that quality by paying the 






2.2.4  Hidden-Action 
 
This literature utilizes the variation in the sensitivity of different cash flows to 
managerial effort.  The literature predicts that the likelihood of securitization is 
proportional to the invariance of the cash flow to managerial effort. A tenuous23 
distinction is drawn between the ability of management to influence the value of cash 
flows and the ability of management to influence the collection of cash flows.   It is 
assumed that while the former is insensitive to managerial effort, the latter is susceptible 
to managerial shirking.   
 
Agency costs may be reduced by asset securitization.  This method of reducing 
agency costs may in fact be superior to requiring that managers be residual claimants.  
Asset securitization is a way to avoid risk aversion on the part of management when 
required to hold a substantial form of their wealth in the form of residual claims. 
(Iacobucci&Winter, 2005) 
 
Monitoring of managerial effort is enhanced when cash flows, which are 
insensitive to managerial effort, are separated from those that are not.   In an application 
of Holoström’s model of the effect of managerial reputation on action and effort, the 
decision to securitize assets signals managerial commitment to great effort.  
 
                                                
23 The distinction is tenuous because anecdotal evidence suggests that there exists some set of skills, apart from the absence of 
shirking, which are suited to collection.  Therefore, even in the absence of shirking, the value of future cash flows may be different 
depending on the talent of the manager in charge of collection.  (www.calculatedrisk.blogspot.com) 
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Through securitization, firms may also be able to reduce the probability of a take-
over.  Firms that are poorly managed are more likely to be acquired than firms with poor 
assets.   Managers have a reduced incentive to expend effort in order to avoid a take-over 
when there is a chance that the market will mistake poor asset quality for poor 
management.  In order to increase managerial effort, if is therefore in the firm’s interests 
to securitize all assets that are insensitive to managerial effort.  (Iacobucci&Winter, 2005) 
 
 
2.3  Regulatory motives for Securitization by Banks 
 
Securitization by banks in particular has an added complication when the contract 
includes recourse provisions.  A recourse provision is an agreement by the bank to absorb 
some of the risk of the assets.  Such provisions include agreements to pay shortfalls in 
interest (STRIPS) and principal, an agreement to buy the asset back from the investor in 
the event of default, (SLCs24) or the retention of the riskiest tranche25 of the securitized 
assets.   Berger and Benveniste (1992) perceive the SLC as an uninsured demand deposit.  
Their paper argues that securitization with SLC credit enhancement improves efficiency26 
by allowing banks to circumvent the prohibition of issuing senior debt  
 
If in fact SLCs create uninsured demand deposits, the ramifications for bank risk 
should be considered.  In the absence of deposit insurance, demand deposits contracts 
                                                
24 Secured Letters of Credit (SLC’s) 
25 The most junior claim to the proceeds of pool of securitized assets.   
26 .  The regulation against senior debt reduces efficiency by restricting the kind of contracts banks can write. 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lead to multiple equilibria, which include a bank run equilibrium. (Dvbvig&Diamond, 
1983) Just as the expectation that the bank will not be able to satisfy all demand deposits 
tomorrow leads to a bank run today; so too can the simultaneous fall in value of 
securitized assets lead to the synchronous exercising of multiple SLCs.    
 
Regulatory arbitrage is purported to be a motivation for asset securitization by 
banks.  Regulatory arbitrage refers to the reallocation of assets that occurs when a firm’s 
true risk deviates from the level of risk consistent with the constraints imposed by 
regulation.  If a bank’s reserves are in excess of what is required to meet claims by 
depositors and to cover for loan defaults, the bank will securitize its less risky assets until 
the riskiness of the loan portfolio held is commensurate with reserve requirements.  
(Greenspan, 1998)  Chapter Three deals more explicitly with regulatory arbitrage. 
 
 
2.4   A Model of the Incentives to Securitize and Offer Credit Enhancements under 
the CRA and when the Institutions Desires to Merge 
 
Assumption 1:  there are 2 regimes, a CRA and a non-CRA regime, where community 






Regime 1:  Bank Expansion and CRA Compliance are unrelated 
Assumption 2: there are only 2 kinds of assets to be securitized, High Quality and Low 
Quality. 
 
Let,   
€ 
i        denote  the yield received by buyer 
€ 
p       denote the actual rate of return on high quality asset to seller 
€ 
Χ      denote the face value of the pool of assets securitized 
€ 
CE    denote credit enhancements offered by the seller 
€ 
h       denote high quality assets 
€ 
l        denote low quality assets 
€ 
q       index the quality of the asset, 
€ 





q is known to the seller, but not to the buyer 
 
Return to the buyer: 
€ 
ΠB = (1+ iq )X + CE      (1a) 
 
Return to seller: 
€ 
ΠS = 1+ pq( )Χ −CE − 1+ iq( )Χ     (1b) 
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CE
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In Regime 1, buyers can require 
€ 
CE * to ensure that only “High Quality” assets are sold. 
 
Regime 2: CRA Compliance related Bank Expansion 
 
Assumption 4: A bank’s ability to expand is proportional the number of community loans 
originated and purchased, but not held.   
 
Assumption 5:  The more community loans a bank originates or purchases, the more 
community loans it will securitize.    
 
Assumption 6: All “Low Quality” loans are community loans. 
 
Assumption 7:  Only firms that securitize “High Quality” loans are able to expand. 
 





β e  =    The present value of the future benefits of a future business expansion 
 
€ 
θ    =    The proportion of loans that are “Low Quality” 
€ 
φ    =     The probability of a satisfactory CRA rating 
€ 
T   =     The sum of the face values of “High Quality” and “Low Quality” assets     




φ θ( )  and 
€ 
φ'> 0   (4)    
 





  (5a)     and     
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1−θ( ) = Xh
Xl + Xh





Profit to the seller = 
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 + φ θ( )β e     (6a) 
 
The maximum CE the seller is willing to offer satisfies the following condition: 
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 + φ θ( )β e = 0    (6b) 
 
and is given by, 
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CE = 0 and solving for 
€ 
i , we arrive with 
 
€ 
CE = 0⇒ i = ph −θ ph − pl( ) + φ θ( )
β e
XT















 φ'    (7b) 
 
The seller generates a higher return by selling “Low Quality” loans because of the 




The buyer will not raise CE above 
€ 
CE *because the raise would not alter the 




λ   denote the probability that the buyer will receive r from the bundle 
 
The expected Profit to the buyer: 
€ 




    (8) 
 
The use of credit enhancements will “exclude” the banks that securitize only 
“Low Quality” loans, but will not prevent banks that securitize “High Quality” loans 
from securitizing “Low Quality” ones as well. 
 
Predictions from the Model: 
 
I Banks should securitize more when if they plan to expand in the future 
II The credit enhancements that banks offer will not increase before expansion 
 
 
2.5  The Empirical Test 
 
To test the model given above we examine a panel of banks that securitized loans 
from the second quarter of 2004 until the first quarter of 2006.  Fixed effects panel data 




• value of pools securitized 
• credit enhancements on securitized pools 
• the ratio of the credit enhancements to the pools securitized 
 
A panel data model is convenient because the median and distribution of income for 
the bank’s assessment area is difficult to measure.  Firm fixed effects will capture the 
unobserved firm specific heterogeneity.  Time fixed effects will capture the heterogeneity 
in the propensity of buyers to purchase loans27.  Random effects models offered no 
improvement over the fixed effects models, suggesting very little change in character of 
the assessment areas over the window of time sampled. 
 
Under examination are: 
 
• the marginal effects of having a CRA exam  
• the marginal effects of having a CRA exam when you plan to expand in the future 
 
  With that in mind, after controlling for the value of bank deposits, the effects of 
an assessment in the previous, current and next quarter on the dependent variables are 
estimated. The value of an upcoming merger or acquisition and the interaction between 
                                                
27 In particular, there was a change in the policy of Fannie Mae to buy subprime loans late in 2005.   
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current assessment and the value of an upcoming merger or acquisition is included 
amongst the independent variables.  The results are presented in the Table 2.1.   
 
Some important omitted variables are measurements of community group 
pressure and expansion through the establishment of new branches.  Community group 
pressure is omitted because level call report disclosure is made for banks on a more 
disaggregated level of the corporate structure than pledges to community groups, which 
are usually undertaken by the parent companies.  The parent companies of the banks 
filing the call report are often no observable.  Branching is not included as a measure of 
expansion because community groups do not appear to protest the opening of new 
branches.  There are many instances of community group protests for mergers and 


















Results of Panel Regression of Securitized Assets and Credit Enhancements on Bank and 
CRA-Related Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 






















































R2 within 0.5163 0.0557 0.0002 
€ 
R2 between 0.7511 0.3601 0.0011 
€ 
R2 overall 0.7400 0.3369 0.0001 
Pr>F(Indep.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.9854 
Pr>F(groups) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
€ 
σ u  3183177.4 379434.9 0.432 
€ 
σ e  893947.63 134940.25 0.196 
€ 
ρ  0.9268 0.888 0.829 
Number obs. 5344 5338 5344 
Number Groups 669 669 669 
*** - significant at the 1% level,  ** - significant at the 5% level 
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 Table 2.2 contains the results of a similar panel regression that measures the 
change in securitized assets as a proportion of total deposits.  Total deposits were used 
instead of total assets to give an indication of the proportion of securitized assets to bank 
size while avoiding the problems caused by the negative relationship between off balance 
sheet and on balance sheet assets.  Although the coefficients do not explain a great deal 
of variation in the proportion of securitized assets and credit enhancements, we see the 
same pattern in the effects of exams and mergers on their own and when interacted.   
 
TABLE 2.2 
Results of Panel Regression of Securitized Assets and Credit Enhancements as a Fraction of 
Deposits on Bank and CRA-Related Variables 
 (1) (2) 
 Securitized Assets  (SEC) as a 
Fraction of Deposits 
Credit Enhancements (CE) 
As a Fraction of Deposits 


























Number obs. 5344 5338 
Number Groups 669 669 





2.6  Interpretation of Results 
 
The occurrence of a CRA assessment has no significant effect on any of the 
dependent variables.  This result is inconsistent with the impression that banks compete 
for high CRA assessments in order to generate goodwill.  However, if a firm is planning 
to expand in the future and is undergoing an exam in the current quarter, an increment of 
$1,000 in the value of future expansion predicts an increase of $286.70 in the amount of 
securitization.  
 
The same increase of $1,000 in the value of future expansion predicts an increase 
in credit enhancements of only $32. The difference in the magnitude of these effects 
seems to be consistent with the predictions of the model:  the requirement of a least a 
“satisfactory” CRA rating increases the total amount of securitization, but not the credit 
enhancements. The lack of proportionality of credit enhancements offered for securitizing 
riskier loans constitutes evidence that banks do not incur the full costs of originating risky 
loans.   This result will strengthen the incentive to originate loans for CRA compliance.  
This is also consistent with the results presented in column (c) of the Table 2.1.  None of 
the explanatory variables, particularly the interaction between future expansion and 
current assessment, explains any of the variation in the ratio of credit enhancements to 





2.7  Concluding Remarks 
 
The data shows that the Act is applied as it is written: CRA compliance is 
important when a bank is planning an expansion.  The results reveal that banks do not 
retain all of the loans they originate in order to comply with the CRA.  The primary 
lender does not have to offer more credit enhancements as a proportion of securitized 
assets in order to induce investors to accept the newly securitized assets.  This means that 
investors may not be fully cognizant of the riskiness of the loans they are purchasing.  
More importantly it indicates that banks may not have to incur the full cost of originating 
loans for CRA purposes.  If these riskier CRA related loans do not carry a higher 
proportion of credit enhancements, banks do not incur greater costs in the event of 




CHAPTER  THREE 
 
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHANGING LENDING  
STANDARDS OF GSES AND PRIVATE FIRMS IN THE  




Firms with widely divergent regulatory structures compete for mortgages on the 
secondary market. Specifically, private securitizers compete with government-sponsored 
giants, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. For 30 years these firms operated as privately 
owned public utilities.  Although they raised capital on the private market, they enjoyed 
special regulatory protections and advantages.   In return for these advantages, they were 
required to purchase loans to low and middle-income (LMI) households in prescribed 
proportions.  This paper investigates the types of loans the primary lenders kept28 and the 
types sold to GSEs and private firms on the secondary market.  
 
I predictably find that lenders are less likely to originate refinance loans, subprime 
loans and subordinate lien or unsecured loans.  However once they have been originated, 
lenders are more likely to keep these kinds of loans.  Against the benchmark of the 
                                                
28 Primary lenders may keep the loans it does not sell on the balance sheet or they may create their own mortgage-backed securities.  
In the case of the latter, the primary lender is often still exposed to downside risk through the guarantees and credit enhancements 
offered on securitized loans. 
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primary lender retaining a loan, I use a multinomial logit regression to compare the 
likelihood that a loan may either find its way to a wholly private securitizer or the public-
private chimaeras, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The results also indicate that Fannie 
Mae engages in buying risky loans as measured by higher loan amount to income ratios.  
In 2005 and 2006, each unit increase in the ratio of the loan amount to income, increased 
the probability of Fannie Mae purchasing the loan by 0.11%.    
 
 I also use a nested logit regression to measure how the probabilities of 
origination, retention and to sell to a GSE change from 2001 until 2006.  The results 
reflect the increasing intensity of competition in the secondary market after 2003. The 
probability of selling a loan to a GSE, conditional on the institutions decision not to keep 
it, declines from 67% to 35% between 2001 and 2006.  The extent of competition in the 
secondary market has profound implications for GSEs because of their unique regulatory 
structure and incentives. 
 
 
3.1  Overview of the Primary and Secondary Markets for Mortgages 
 
Banks and mortgage companies do not keep all the loans that they originate and 
purchase on their balance sheet29.  Figure 3.1 displays the number of loans held and sold 
to different firms on the secondary market between 2001 and 2006.  Lenders typically 
                                                
29 When an institution alienates a loan it is often not an outright sale, ownership may revert to the institution if the loan does not 
perform within limits set by the contract at the time of sale.   
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held between 27% and 38% of the loans they originated and purchased over this period.  
The lenders sold between 15% and 37% of their loans to GSEs.  In 2001, lenders sold 
over 16 times as many loans to GSEs as they did to private securitizers.  By 2006, that 
multiple had dwindled to 2.4.  The secondary market seems to have become more 
competitive between 2001 and 2006.   
 
FIGURE 3.1 
Number of New Loans held and sold on the Secondary Market between 2001 and 2006 
 
Source: HMDA Loan Application Register Data 
 
Many institutions choose to exchange their loan stock for cash and mortgage-
backed securities (MBS).  Loans are purchased and repackaged as MBS on the secondary 
market.  The same banks that sold the loans to be repackaged on the secondary market 
often purchase these MBS. The minimum ratio of equity to debt is regulated according to 
the kind of assets that banks hold. AA rated MBS require a 1.6% rate of capitalization, 
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while residential mortgages require 4%.  Assuming that debt is cheaper than equity30, 
banks can lower their cost of capital by selling loans and purchasing MBS on the 
secondary market.  The provisions of the Basel II accord of 2004 would have eliminated 
this advantage to MBS if it had been widely adopted31.     
 
Mortgage companies, Federal Home Loan Banks, the largest commercial banks 
and securities trading firms compete with the GSEs on the secondary market.  GSEs are 
able to raise capital more cheaply than these entities.  Studies estimate that the GSEs debt 
is between 25 and 29 basis points below banking sector bonds that are AA rated 
(Ambrose and Warga, 2002). An equity to asset ratio of less than 4% for both GSEs 
corroborates these findings.  At this juncture it is necessary to address the reasons for the 
regulatory advantages GSEs enjoy and their overall regulatory environment. 
 
 
3.2   GSEs: Background and Regulatory Framework 
 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home 
Loan Corporation (Freddie Mac) dominate the secondary market, these firms are 
collectively called government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).  The GSEs were initially 
wholly government owned and operated entities.  Fannie Mae was created during the 
Great Depression to purchase government guaranteed loans. Between 1968 and 2007, 
                                                
30 Assuming that the provisions of Modigliani and Miller do not hold exactly in the “real world” 
31 Widespread adoption of the Basel II accord has been postponed, pending further discussion since 2004. 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Fannie Mae was privately owned and funded and no longer purchased government 
guaranteed loans.   Freddie Mac was created in 1970 in order to provide liquidity to the 
secondary market.  The privately funded GSEs enjoyed a variety of federally granted 
advantages over their competitors in the secondary market.  The federal government 
expressly did not guarantee GSE debt and securities, however it conferred so many 
protections upon the GSEs that investors behaved as though the debt and securities are 
guaranteed.  (see below) 
 
The GSEs are exempt from state and local income taxes.  The securities they issue 
are classified as government securities.  This means that they may be purchased in 
unlimited amounts by banks.  Government securities are exempt form SEC registration 
and reporting requirements.  However Fannie Mae voluntarily registered its securities 
with the SEC in 2003. The treasury has the right to purchase $2.25 bn. of GSE securities 
and the Federal Reserve may purchase the securities as part of their open market 
operations.  The value of the bundle of protections and advantages bestowed upon the 
GSEs is often referred to as a “halo” or charter value.   
 
It is the stated intention of the regulatory structure to pass on lower borrowing 
costs to households and to encourage home ownership. GSEs pay for their lower 
borrowing costs by meeting the loan purchase targets set for them by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Table 3.1 contains the HUD goals and GSE 
performance from 2001 until 2007.  The numbers represent the percentage of all GSE 
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purchases in a given year that must be devoted to home purchase loans32 to LMI 
households. 
TABLE 3.1 




The LMI goal is set higher after 2000 and then increases steadily after 2004. In 
Figure 3.2 the bars labeled “Actual Market” represent the HUD estimates of the actual 
LMI market for mortgages.  Between 2004 and 2008, the GSE LMI goals rise 49% to 
54% and the HUD estimates of the size of the market fall from 58% to 52%. In 2007 and 
2008, the GSEs were required support the collapsing market by purchasing troubled 
mortgages.  The GSE goals therefore exceed the estimated market share.  
 
 
                                                





 GSE Goals and Performance (1996-2009) 
 
 
source: GSE Report Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010) 
 
 
Between 2003 and 2007 the GSEs routinely met the LMI goals. In 2005 the HUD 
estimated that the GSEs would have to originate an additional 400,000 qualifying loans to 
meet their goals. (HUD, 2005)   400,000 loans are less than 10% of the number loans 
they financed in 2005 and represent approximately a 2% rise in the LMI goal. (Mortgage 
Banking, 2005) The margin by which the GSE exceeded their goals fell after 2001, from 
between 3% and 6% to between 1% and 3%.  This indicates that the HUD goals were 





3.3  GSE Conforming Loans 
 
The GSEs buy only loans that meet prescribed requirements to create a kind of 
uniformity in the loans in the MBS they sell and to control the credit risk of the MBS 
pool.  In order for a loan to be a conforming loan, the applicant must supply certain 
documentation and must not exceed prescribed debt-to-income ratios. Traditionally, loans 
eligible for purchase by a GSE required a 20% down payment and did not carry payments 
exceeding 28% of monthly income and total debt servicing costs did not exceed 36% of 
income33.  The property value must also not exceed a certain threshold.  The threshold 
depends upon the average MSA property price and the number of families that the home 
is built for. The threshold exceeds the loan amount of 95% of home values34.  The 
intention of the threshold is to preclude the purchase of “jumbo loans”, or home loans 
that are over $400,000.   
 
However, there was erosion in GSE underwriting standards35 and conforming 
loan requirements.  Deficiencies in the percentage down payment could be compensated 
for on other dimensions of loan quality and vice versa.  The ambiguity in the GSE 
conforming loan algorithm favored a general lowering of lending standards. GSEs 
offered brokers incentives to persuade borrowers to accept higher rates of interest in 
return for lower down payments36.   
                                                
33 This is known as the 23-36 front-back rule. 
34 Measured as a percentage of total applications in excess of $400,000 in 2004.   
35 Fannie Mae CEO Daniel Mudd testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2010 that underwriting standards began to 
slip in 2004, despite the contrary intentions of the executive. 
36 This type of monetary incentive is called a Yield Spread Premium. 
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3.4  The GSEs, Risk and Moral Hazard 
 
GSEs receive government protection from insolvency and, through lowering 
borrowing costs, government protection from competition.  These twin protections have 
opposing implications for risk taking.  The latent 37guarantee on GSE debt and MBS 
obligations has clear moral hazard implications.  GSEs are said to have a government 
protected charter value.  Much of the theory of risk taking and charter value is adapted to 
GSEs from the banking literature. 
 
Technically, the charter value would be measured by a Tobin’s Q type 
measurement. Passmore (2005) estimated the present value of the stream of future charter 
benefits to shareholders to be $79 million.  A 2004 Congressional Budget Office study 
estimated the charter benefit to be $19.6 bn for the single year of 2003.  The same study 
accrued $13.4bn. of this benefit to consumers, through lower rates of interest, and $6.2 
bn. of this benefit to shareholders.  The $6.2 bn. benefit to shareholders for 2003 is 
consistent with the Passmore study using a 7% discount rate.  This was not an 
unreasonable estimate at the time of the study.  It falls between the return on equities of 
8.86% and the return on debt of 4.7%38. (Damodaran, 2006)  
 
Theory predicts that risk taking is inversely proportional to charter value.  Owners 
avoid making decisions that have large down side risk to avoid insolvency and the loss of 
                                                
37 The use of the adjective “latent” is mine. “tacit” or “implied”  are usually used to describe the GSE guarantee.   They do not capture 
expressed denial by at least one party.  Latent, defined as potentially existing but not presently evident or realized, is more appropriate.   
38 Using 2001-2006 data 
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the charter value provided there is a credible threat that they will lose their interest in the 
case of insolvency.  The charter value is held to be the sum of the going concern value 
and the value of the real option of taking risks and avoiding losing ownership if a 
negative outcome is realized.  Boyd and Nicolo (2005) argue charter value could be 
positively related to risk seeking because market power in the loan market could lead to 
charging higher interest rates and higher probability of default.   
 
Empirical investigations that regress the Tobin’s Q for banks on earnings 
volatility find in favor of an inverse relationship between charter value and risk taking.  
(Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strathan, 1996; Allen and Rai, 1996)  A body that is separate 
from the HUD is responsible for overseeing GSE safety and soundness.  The Office of 
Federal Housing Oversight (OFHEO) was established in 1992 to set and monitor rates of 
capitalization and GSE activities.  The GSEs are required to capitalize at a rate equal to 
the greater of the sum of 2.5% of their on balance sheet assets and 0.45% of their off 
balance sheet assets OR a percentage proportional to the capital required to sustain 
operations for 10 years in the event of shocks to the interest rate39, as measured by “stress 
tests”.  In addition to these capital requirements, GSEs were required to hold 30% above 
the minimum requirements to cover operating risks, such as losses due to fraud and 
negligence.  However, the protection provided by these regulations depends upon the 
accounting standards employed by the GSEs and inversely to the degree regulatory 
laxity.  Both GSEs experienced accounting scandals between 2003 and 2004 and Fannie 
                                                
39 Stress tests, or estimates of the distribution of loss given default, were typically conducted for a 75% increase in the interest rate or a 
50% decline in interest rates.   
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Mae was notorious for recognizing delinquencies when payments were 24 months past 
their due date40 (GSE Report, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2010) and for using 
“cookie jar” reserves to delay recognizing income until it was necessary to offset losses.  
Fannie was said to have a corporate culture that expressly emphasized performance 
smoothing over fidelity to accounting standards (Haggerty et. al. (2004)).  The inputs to a 
model of risk-based capital were therefore flawed.  Therefore, the models deliberately 
underestimated the variance in performance. 
 
The literature tells us that risk aversion is proportional to charter value and 
inversely related to competition, but it does not give an indication of the relative value of 
the charter or the extent of the competition.  Frame and White (2007) purport that the 
entry of Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB) into the secondary market and the adoption 
of Basel II would lead to a reduction in the charter value and an increase in risk taking 
behavior by the GSEs.  Frame and White state that the most cost effective way for the 
GSEs to take on more risk is by using riskier financial instruments and arrangements and 
not by lowering conforming loan standards41.  However, it should be noted that defaults 
on Fannie Mae loans (Figure 3.3) are negatively correlated with the decline in Fannie 
Mae’s market share as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  Figure 3.3 below shows that loans 
originated from 2004 onwards had higher rates of default than loans originated before 
that time.  It should be noted that the low default rates in 2002 and 2003 are attributable 
                                                




to the questionable accounting practices employed by Fannie Mae at that time and 
exposed in 2004.  
 
FIGURE 3.3 
Fannie Mae Defaults by Year of Origination and Quarters after Origination 
 
Source:  Fannie Mae Credit Summary Q2, 2009 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the rate of default on first lien loans secured by real estate for 









                                                
42 There was an accounting change in the measurement of defaults after 2001.  2001 has been omitted as it is not directly comparable. 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FIGURE 3.4   
Default Rate for Commercial Banks on First Lien loans secured by Real Estate (2002-2006) 
 
Source: FFIEC Call Report 
 
By comparing figures 3.3 and 3.4, we see that although the default rate on loans 
held by commercial banks is higher than that for GSEs, the rate for GSEs is increasing 
while the rate for commercial banks is not.  This pattern suggests that while the lending 
standards for commercial banks stayed relatively stable between 2003 and 2006, lending 
standards for GSEs fell after 2003.  If we read Figure 3.3 in conjunction with the GSE 
LMI goals, we see that the increase in GSE LMI purchases and goals in 2001 corresponds 
to a decline is default rates.  There appears to be a positive correlation between GSE 
goals, performance and default rates after 2004, even if we ignore the questionable pre-
2004 accounting.   Figures 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 track the relationship between the GSE default 






FIGURES 3.5.1 &3.5.2   
GSE Goals, Performance and Default Rates 
 
 
The coincidence of the decline in lending standards by the GSEs and the increase 
in competition in the secondary market is consistent with Frame and White’s hypothesis.  
There is also an indication that default rates after 2004 are related to LMI mortgage goals 
and purchases.  The decline in GSE lending standards after 2004 can therefore be 
attributed, in uncertain proportions, to both market and regulatory forces. 
 
 
3.5  Trends and Data Description 
 
The loan application data is from the Loan Application Registers (LAR) that 
lenders in metropolitan areas are required to complete for all their loan applications.  The 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) requires lenders to keep LARs.  LARs record 
the income and race of the applicant, the loan amount and the decision by the bank to 
originate, purchase or deny the application.  If the lender intends to sell the loan to a 
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GSE, another bank, private securitizer or mutual fund, this is recorded on the LAR.  
GSEs43 provide free software that indicates whether a loan is eligible for sale to the GSE 
at the time of application.   
 
From 2005, the LAR required the lender to record the demographic and income 
characteristics of the census tract where the home in question is located. Between 27 
million and 41 million home loan applications were filed each year between 2001 and 
2006.  The acceptance rate over this period of time is illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
 
FIGURE 3.6 
Originations and Purchases as a Fraction of Total Applications between 2001 and 2006 
 
Source: HMDA Data 
 
Figure 3.6 shows that a large number of applications for new loans are accepted.  
It also shows that the percentage of origination fell after 2003.  It also showed that after 
                                                
43 Private securitizers usually charge for their approval software. 
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2003, the rate at which loans were purchased from other institutions increased.  
Typically, the average applicant income for loans originated and kept by the lender and 
loans sold to private securitizers is higher than the applicant income for loans sold to 
GSEs.  Figure 3.7 below shows the average applicant income over time. 
 
FIGURE 3.7 




  Figure 3.7 shows the average income of Fannie Mae borrowers tracks closely 
with Freddie Mac borrowers.  The average income of borrowers whose loans are kept by 
the bank and sold to private securitizers exceeds that of those sold to GSEs throughout 
the period.  Unfortunately, the HMDA data does not capture credit scores.  However, 










Reading Figures 3.7 and 3.8 together we see that lenders typically keep loans with 
a higher average income and a lower loan amount to income ratio.  Ostensibly riskier 
investments are moved to the secondary market.  Between 2003 and 2006, the loan to 
income ratio for GSEs rises, while the ratio rises and falls for lenders and private 
securitizers.   
Figure 3.9 graphs the change in median US home price by region between 2001 
and 2008.  Between 2001 and 2002, 11 of 159 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
experienced a decrease in median home price, between 2005 and 2004 only 4 MSAs 
experienced a decline. The steady increase in the median house price between 2001 and 









Median Home Price for US and by Region 
 
Source: National Assocition of Realtors 
 
However, by 2006 signs of general decline emerged as 35 MSAs showed a 
decline in median home value.  As a crude barometer of speculative activity one may 
note that between 2001 and 2006 total applications grew by 23% and applications for 
non-owner occupied housing grew by 131%.  The trajectory of median home prices is 
important not only because of speculative activity on the one side, but also because the 
willingness of lenders to approve applications is influenced by the value of the assets 








3.6  A Brief Account of Some of the Variables 
 
The “no recourse” provision 
 
In some states, in the event of a foreclosure, lenders are not permitted to claim 
any assets of the borrowers apart from the house.  Such a limitation on the rights of the 
lender is called a no recourse provision.  A dummy variable equal to 1 indicates if the 





The Home Owner Equity Protection Act (1994) protects subprime borrowers, 
whose debt is secured by their home, from dramatic changes to the terms of their 
repayments.  A loan is said to have HOEPA status if either the annual percentage rate 
(APR) or the sum of any amount paid to lower the interest rate and the fees exceeds a 
“trigger” amount45 over and above the treasury with a comparable maturity at the time of 
origination.  If a loan has HOEPA status, the borrower is protected against balloon 
payments and hikes in the rate of interest that exceed levels prescribed by HOEPA. 
 
 
                                                
44 The “no recourse” states are:  AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, DC, GA, HI, ID, MS, MO, MT, NV, NH, OR, TN, TX, VA, WA, WV. 
45 The trigger amount during the period in question was 8% APR for first lien loans and 10% APR for subordinate lien loans.  Fees 





Mortgage companies do not have to satisfy demand deposits and are not subject to 




A mortgage guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).  Low-
income applicants who do not qualify for private mortgage insurance (PMI) and who 
cannot afford a down payment are granted FHA loans if the FHA determines that the loan 
is not too risky.  The FHA agrees to pay any unpaid principal to the lending institution 
and the lender pays an insurance premium to the FHA.   
 
Ginnie Mae Loans 
 
The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) was created to 
assume the role that Fannie Mae was originally intended for, to purchase FHA loans.  
Unlike the MBS of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae’s MBS are expressly 






3.7  Empirical Investigation: Multinomial Logit 
 
I make use of a multinomial logit model to estimate the marginal effects of loan 
characteristics, borrower characteristics, lender characteristics and the demographic data 
for the tract where the property is located on the fate of a particular loan application.  A 
random sample of 338,283 loan applications was taken from the 2005 and 2006 LAR 
data46.  The summary statistics can be found in Table D1 of Appendix D.  The 
coefficients will indicate whether an independent variable makes it more or less likely 
that a loan will be allocated to a particular buyer, relative to the base case of being kept 
by the lender.   By comparing the estimated marginal effects we can tell something about 
the relative appetitive of the purchasers for different kinds of loans. 
 
A loan application can be denied, originated and kept by the bank, originated and 
sold to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, a private securitizer or some other buyer.  
By comparing the marginal effects for Ginnie Mae, the GSEs and private securitizers we 
can understand how the intensity of government protection influences the incentives to 






                                                
46 2005 and 2006 applications had fields that captured the demographic data for the location of the property to be purchased or 




Possible Values for the Dependent Variable 
Number Outcome Notes 
0 Loan Application is Denied 
 
                  - 
1 Loan is Originated and kept by the bank 
 
The lender keeps the loan or the bank 
chooses to securitize the loan in house. 
2 Loan is sold to Fannie Mae The lender sells the loan to Fannie Mae in 
return for MBS or cash.  No obligations 
remain on the part of the lender. 
 
3 Loan is sold to Freddie Mac As above 
 
4 Loan sold to Ginnie Mae The government owned entity buys the 
loan. 
 
5 Loan is sold to private securitizer The bank may still service the loan, the 
loan could revert back to the bank in the 
event of default. 
 





The independent variables are selected to capture the risk of the loan and the 
appetite for risk by the lender. Table 3.3 lists some of the independent variables and the 
justification for their inclusion.  Not all variables have been listed as some do not require 
















A measurement of the risk attached to the 
loan.  The higher the loan amount 




Borrowers use refinance loans to pay off 
existing loans to take advantage of lower 
interest rates and better terms.  Often 
distressed borrowers use this option, 
these loans could be riskier than 
conventional loans. 
 
Non-owner Occupied Housing 
 
Borrowers are more likely to walk away 
from properties they don’t live in.  





High interest sub prime loans, lenders are 
not permitted to adjust interest rates and 








Lender will get paid after the other 
creditors in the event of liquidation.  
Risky Loan. 
  
Median MSA Home Price 
 
An indication of the value of the property 
that secures the loan.  The more valuable 
the property, the more to be recouped in a 
liquidation. 
 
Income/Median MSA Income 
 
An indication of risk, a borrower living 
above his means. 
 
Tract to MSA Income Ratio 
 
A measurement of the affluence of the 
neighborhood where the property is 




Mortgage companies do not have to 
satisfy demand deposits, they are likely 





The values of the estimated marginal effects for the secondary markets players 
relative to the base case of keeping the loan indicates the propensity of the different 
purchasers to take risks in the secondary markets. 
 
The results for the unordered multinomial logistic regression are presented in 
Appendix D.  Column (1) of Table D1 indicates that lenders are selective when it comes 
to loans with high loan amounts relative to applicant income, refinance loans, loans with 
subordinate lien provisions and unsecured loans. HOEPA loan applications are 33% less 
likely to be denied than they are to be originated and kept on the books.   
 
Column (4) shows Ginnie Mae fulfilling its role of purchasing FHA loans.  
 
Examining the coefficients on Loan Amount/ Income in columns (2) and (3) to 
column (5) reveals that it is more probable that loans with higher Loan Amount to 
Income ratios are sold to Fannie Mae than they are to be kept by the lender.  The GSEs 
are less likely than private securitizers to purchase unsecured loans, loans with 
subordinate liens and refinance loans.  Calculated at the sample means, HOEPA loan 
applications are 27% less likely to be denied and more likely to stay in the possession of 
the lender.  Mortgage companies are more likely to use private securitizers than GSEs. 
 
The regression suggests that if GSEs wanted to increase their risk exposure they 
would do so by accepting loans with high loan to income ratios as opposed to refinance 
 
88 
loans and loans for no-owner occupied housing. Separate multinomial logit models were 
run for each year from 2001 until 2006.  Figure 3.10 compares the marginal effects of an 
increase in the ratio of loan amount to income, measured at the sample means, on the 
probability of a loan being sold of Fannie Mae and to Private Securitizers each year. 
 
FIGURE 3.10 
A Comparison of the Estimated Marginal Effects of Loan Amount/Income on the Sale of a 
Loan to Fannie Mae and Private Securitizers (2001-2006) 
 
 
 The estimated marginal effects for the Fannie Mae equations were statistically 
different from zero at the one percent level every year from 2001 until 2006.  The 
estimated marginal effects for the private securitizer equations were not.  Between 2001 
and 2006, Fannie Mae had a greater appetite than private securitizers for loan with higher 
loan amount to income ratios.  Figure 3.10 does not show a systematic deterioration in 
Fannie Mae’s lending standards, as measured by the ratio of loan amount to income.  Nor 
does it show a decline in lending standards for private securitizers.  Figure 3.3 indicates 
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that there must have been continual detioration in lending standards after 2004.  Figure 
3.10 suggests that this detioration must have been on some other margin than purchasing 
loans with higer loan amount to income ratios. 
 
 
3.8  Empirical Investigation:  Nested Logit 
 
The multinomial logit model is attractive for its simplicity but assumes that there 
is no correlation between the error terms of the different outcome equations.  The 
multinomial logit model suffers from the assumption of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives IIA). This assumption is not reasonable for the given problem, changes in 
reserve requirements for different kinds of mortgage back securities will effect not only 
the likelihood of keeping a loan, but it will also effect how many are sold to GSEs and 
how many are sold to private securitizers. I employ a nested logit model to partially relax 
the IIA assumption by grouping different sets of alternatives together.   The nesting 
















The loan application is either denied or rejected in the first stage, originated loans 
are either kept or sold and loans that are sold are sold to either GSEs or private 
institutions.  The IIA assumptions are relaxed across nests but not within nests.  Ginnie 
Mae loans were omitted because private firms or securitizers seldom, if ever, buy FHA 
loans. The categories or private securitizing firms and private firms were collapsed into a 
single category. Loans sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were collapsed into a single 
GSE outcome. The choices of purchaser have been reduced to two to eliminate the 
danger of imposing the IIA assumption.  A 2% random sample of non-FHA and VA 
applications was taken from the population of applications.   
 
A nested logit model was run for every year from 2001 until 2006, the results are 
presented in Table E3 of Appendix E.  Tables E1 and E2 of Appendix E show the 
incidence and proportion of different outcomes in the sample by year.  Table E1 in 
Appendix E shows that the number of applications in the sample climbs every year, with 
the exception of 2006.  The rate of origination increases between 2001 and 2003 and 
 
91 
declines after 2003.  In 2003 the originating institutions retained the highest number and 
the lowest proportion of mortgages.  The proportion of mortgage sold to GSEs declines 
from 67% in 2002 to 36% in 2006.  Banks are therefore originating a lower proportion of 
a higher number of applications every year.  The rate of retention falls and rises over the 
period in question and the proportion and number of loans sold to GSEs declines 
throughout.   
 
Although the outcomes can easily be grouped into in subsets that are suitable for a 
nested logit regression, the independent variables do not fall into categories that 
correspond to the different nests.  For instance, the applicants income and the loan 
amount are not exclusively relevant to the origination decision or the retention decision 
but to all decisions.  Therefore the independent variables were located to the first nest so 
that the outcome of all applications could be conditioned upon them instead of only the 
subsample of originated or sold loans.   
 
Table E3 in Appendix E presents the coefficients of the first stage of the nested 
logit.  The first stage is the origination decision, the denial outcome was used as the base 
and the coefficients are interpreted as the change in the log odds of origination, relative to 
denial, due to a change in the independent variable, holding all others constant.  All 
coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level.  The first row of Table E3 shows the 
declining value of income as a predictor or origination after 2001. The regression 
suggests that once a lender takes on a risky loan, it is more likely to hold or perhaps to 
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securitize the loan in house. A possible explanation is that lenders have access to more 
information about the credit worthiness of borrowers of many riskier mortgage products. 
In 2001, a $1,000 increase in income increases the log odds of origination by 0.4%.  In 
2006, the change in the log odds of origination is only 0.09% for a $1,000 increase in 
income.    
 
Lenders measure the ability of an applicant to meet their obligations by the 
fraction of debt service to monthly income.  This measurement of credit risk will be 
correlated with the ratio of the loan amount to annual income.  Row 3 of Table E3 shows 
that applications that record a higher loan amount relative to annual income are less likely 
result in origination.  If the relationship between this ratio and credit risk were stable over 
time, then row 3 would suggest that lenders were the least risk averse in 2002 and 
tightened their standards slightly in 2006.   
 
It is reasonable to expect that the current value and expected future value of the 
underlying property will influence the lenders decisions to originate the loan.  HMDA 
does not collect home value.  I employed the median home price of the MSA where the 
property is located and a dummy variable (West) to indicate if the property was located in 
one of the western states or Florida to capture the value of the home and to indicate 
whether an appreciation in the value of the home could be expected.  Both variables had 
positive coefficients in the origination equation, however the dummy for the western state 
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and Florida exhibited greater economic significance.  In 2004 the fact that an application 
was for a property in one of these states increased the log odds of origination by 12%.   
 
Distressed borrowers often apply for refinance loans, refinance loans therefore are 
less likely to be originated. After 2004, the absolute value of the coefficient for refinance 
loans increases by 8 fold.  Non-owner occupied housing includes speculative properties.  
An application for a loan to buy non-occupied housing is more likely to be originated 
than applications for primary residences.  Applicants with enough income to service an 
additional property are likely to be wealthier and to have better credit ratings.   
 
Mortgage companies employ electronic and telephonic applications, which are 
less costly for a household to make.  Mortgage companies received more applications and 
have a greater denial rate than depository institutions because of their application media.  
Although the application technology is constant throughout this period, in 2005 and 2006 
the change in the log odds of origination for an application at a mortgage company 
declined.  This could indicate a possible lowering of standards at mortgage companies. 
 
Figure E4 in Appendix E shows the conditional probabilities from the logistic 
regression for selected outcomes.  The first graph shows the unconditional probability of 
origination from 2001 until 2006.  The second graph shows the probability of a loan 
being sold, conditional on origination.  The third graph shows the probability of selling 
an unretained loan to a GSE.  The probability of denial, the conditional probability of 
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selling a loan and selling a loan to a private institution are respective mirror images of the 
graphs shown.  The graphs in Figure E4 show that the probability of origination peaks in 
2003 before reverting to its 2001 level.  The probability of retaining a loan conditional on 
it origination stays fairly constant throughout the period.  The third figure shows the 
declining market share of GSEs between 2001 and 2006.  The probability that a loan is 
sold to a GSE, conditional on its begin sold decreases from 67% in 2001 to only 35% in 
2006.   
 
3.9  Concluding Remarks 
 
 The 2003 surge in the purchase of new loans by Fannie Mae and, to a lesser 
extent Freddie Mac, is not explained by any change in the observable characteristics of 
the lender or loan characteristics.  Therefore, GSE appetites for loans appear to be driven 
by regulatory impulses.  The fact that over 4 million originations can be driven by non-
market forces and that GSE lending standards declined after 2003 suggests that many 
risky loans were originated because of the GSEs.  The decline in lending standards that 
was illustrated in Figure 3.3 is reflected in the propensity of GSEs to purchase mortgages 
with higher loan amount to income ratios.  The multinomial logit regression estimates 
that an increase in the loan amount to income ratio of a single unit increases the 
probability that a loan application will be sold to Fannie Mae by 0.11%.  Private 
securitizers purchase loans from applicants with higher incomes and are slightly less 
likely to purchase a loan as the loan amount to income ratio rises.   
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 GSE LMI targets and the propensity of GSEs to purchase loans with higher loan 
amount to income ratios add a new dimension to the findings in Chapters One and Two.  
The secondary market enables the origination of risky loans by banks.  Banks under CRA 
pressure change their lending patterns as they merge and securitize $260 worth of assets 
for every $1,000 of merger value.  GSEs are required to purchase LMI loans to fulfill 
their HUD goals and are more likely to buy loans with high loan amount to income ratios 






 The three chapters in this dissertation present strong circumstantial 
evidence that both the supply and demand for risky loans was influenced, to a large 
extent, by regulation.  The complimentarily of these regulations is not coincidental.  
Banks are expressly given credit for originating and purchasing, but not for holding CRA 
related loans.  GSEs are given credit for purchasing them.  These regulatory measures are 
designed to work in concert to expand home ownership for LMI households.  With two 
such compelling regulatory measures working for the same goal it is hardly surprising 
that over $2 trillion was allocated to bad mortgages.   
 
The secondary market lowered the cost of originating risky loans.  Chapter One 
shows that lending to LMI households changed for CRA regulated firms around the time 
of a merger. Chapter Two shows that investors did not demand credit enhancements 
commensurate with the increased riskiness of the securitized pool of assets.  Chapter 
Three presents evidence that GSEs had lower lending standards than private securitizers 
in order to fulfill their HUD quotas.  Between $141bn and $983.3bn additional mortgages 
were originated in order for banks to comply with the provisions of the CRA.  These 
numbers exceed what they would have been if the secondary market had not enabled LMI 
household loans.  Chapter One shows that the regulatory framework facilitated strategic 








Summary Statistics - Banks 






Total Number of 
Applications 
766 20676.89 147349.9 15 2942238 
Applications 
within AA† 
665 16196.17 106413.9 1 1551447 
Total Originated 
and Purchased 




665 10864.53 72287.78 1 992818 
Total Purchased 766 2862.798 27267.33 0 635801 
Purchased within 
AA 
665 1394.642 10442.59 0 167909 
Total Denials 766 3496.222 22008.17 0 442059 
Denials in AA 665 2913.992 17508.57 0 280856 
Total Applications 
Black Applicants 




665 930.3398 5912.999 0 82438 
Denial of Black 
Applicants 
766 364.4452 2049.75 0 23997 
Denial of Black 
Applicants within 
AA 
665 310.4226 1723.58 0 19550 
Total Applications 
White Applicants 
766 12229.2 90170.83 2 1719861 





Denial of White 
Applicants 
766 1968.223 14497.97 0 320657 
Denial of White 
Applicants within 
AA 
665 1674.403 11705.94 0 216724 
Total Applications 
No Race Given 





665 1745.391 9884.086 0 168418 
Denial of No Race 
Applicants 
766 422.1018 2180.947 0 26759 
Denial of No Race 
Applicants 
766 270.7467 1545.407 0 24561 
 
Ever Pledge 766 .1072363 .3095484 0 1 
Applications LMI 
Households 
196 26877.45 13580.27 11 1184245 
Originations LMI 
Households 








196 15425.49 85816.9 3 778715 
Applications 
Refinance Loans 




665 8431.171 55677.96 0 965966 
Origination 
Refinance Loans 






665 5562.565 36934.31 0 618016 




Summary Statistics – Mortgage Companies 
 












188 61438.56 306865.1 0 2414722 
Total 
Purchased 
188 25955.07 160134.6 0 1302495 


















188 7189.473 33705.52 0 307538 




No Race Given 
Denial of No 
Race 
Applicants 





































Chapter 1: Results 
 
TABLE B1 
  Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Percentage Denials to Black Applicants by Banks 



























































































N 688 688 571 571 
Groups - 157 154 154 
F 8.79 1.86 2.06 0.87 
Cluster Variable - Bank Bank Bank 
†  AA denotes assessment area 
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient 




Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Percentage Denials to White Applicants by Bank 
         
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
White Denial Rate 
(WDR) 


























































































N 761 761 660 660 
Groups - 162 160 160 
F 7.69 4.24 3.98 0.74 
Cluster Variable - Bank Bank Bank 
     
†  AA denotes assessment area 
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient 





 Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Percentage Denials to Applicants who do not Disclose their Race 
by Banks 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
“No Race” Denial 
Rate (NRDR) 


























































































N 647 647 533 533 
Groups - 157 147 147 
F 1.01 4.80 7.64 1.12 
Cluster 
Variable 
- Bank Bank Bank 
†  AA denotes assessment area 
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient 





Effect of CRA and Mergers on Loan Origination to LMI  
Applicants for Banks 
 (a)  (b)  (c)   
Change in % 
LMI Origination  
Change in % of 
LMI in AA† 
















































































N 136 89 89  
R Sq. 0.04 0.06 0.09  
Root MSE 0.07 0.076 0.075  
Standard Error 
Correction 
Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap  
†  AA denotes assessment area 
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient 




Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Origination of Refinance Loans by Banks 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
Rate of Refinance 
Loans Originated 
(RLO) 

































































































N 760 760 659 659 
Groups - 162 160 160 
F 15.52 1.18 1.97 1.65 
Cluster Variable - Bank Bank Bank 
†  AA denotes assessment area 
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient 




Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Percentage Denials to Applicants by Race   
(Mortgage Companies) 

































         


























         
N 170 178 125 183 
Groups 38 41 35 40 
F 2.73 1.22 1.78 3.36 








     
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient 








Chapter 2 Data Sources and Definitions and Sample Statistics 
 
This paper makes use of data from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC).  The council specifies guidelines and collects data from the four 
agencies responsible for bank regulation, the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).  There are two kinds of FFIEC data 
used above.  The data on the timing of CRA exams is taken from the public search engine 
on the FFIEC website47.  The balance sheet and off-balance sheet data is available on the 
bank regulatory Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) website. WRDS collects the 
bank regulatory data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income48 (the “Call 
Report”) that banks are required to submit to the FFIEC every quarter.  Ever national, 
FRB member state chartered bank and insured state chartered nonmember bank is 
required to file a Call Report every quarter.  Banks submit their reports at the close of 
business on the last calendar day of the quarter.   
 
Sample Construction 
The panel is the constituent of reporting banks that securitize loans.  8,303 banks 
submitted Call Reports in the fourth quarter of 2005.  686 of these banks securitized 
                                                
47 http://www.ffiec.gov/CRA/ratings.htm 
48 FFIEC 031 & 041 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assets in the same quarter.  678 of these banks had CRA records49 and filed Call Reports 





Exam is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the bank has been given a CRA 
assessment that quarter. 
 
Assets  (RCON2170) 
This includes investments in other companies, assets held from trading and all 
loans held by the bank.  Off-balance sheet assets are, of course, excluded. 
 
Deposits  (RCFD2200) 
As defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, deposits include all checking, 
savings, trusts and money received by the bank.  Reciprocal obligations between banks 
are netted. 
 
Loans Secured by Real Estate (RCON3385) 
The quarterly average of all loans secured by real estate, including home equity 
lines of credit, second mortgages etc.   
                                                




First Lien Real Estate Loans  (RCON5367) 
Non-revolving loans secured by first claims on real estate on dwellings for 1-4 
families.   
 
Junior Lien Real Estate Loans (RCON5368) 
Non-revolving loans secured by junior claims on real estate on dwellings for 1-4 
families.   
 
Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) (RCON5370) 
All non-revolving loans secured by 1-4 family dwellings that pay floating or 
adjustable rates. 
 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) (RCON8639) 
The sum of the bank’s holding of MBS held to maturity and held for sale.  Those 
held to maturity are valued at amortized cost; the MBS in the trading account are 
recorded at fair market value.   
 
Securitized and Alienated Assets with Recourse (RCFDB705 – B711, RCFDB790) 
Outstanding balance of assets sold and securitized by the reporting bank or 
another entity with servicing retained or other credit enhancements.  The sale of real 
estate loans, home equity lines of credit, credit card debt, auto loans, commercial and 
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industrial loans are included.  Includes the sale of loans to the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FANNIE MAE), the Federal Home Loan Association (FREDDIE MAC) 
and other government-sponsored enterprises.   
Credit Enhancements (RCFDB712 – B718, RCFDB797 – RCFDB803, RCFDC397- 
RCFD406) 
The amount of interest the bank secures, residual interest50 the bank retains and 



















                                                
50 Residual interest refers to the bank’s ownership of junior claims (tranches) to the cash flows generated by 












Reserves 34220.12 1666.527 307 74296000 
Assets 1146293 61268.19 14719 998466294 
 
Deposits 747237.2 36041.32 11574 703361233 
 
Liabilities 1004260 51386.07 11680 71761145 
 
Real Estate Loans on 
Balance Sheet 
513596.2 25951.65 0 314646603 
 
First-Lien Real Estate 
Loans 
161074.8 11056.31 0 175890800 
 
Second-Lien Real Estate 
Loans 












162979.1 33448.03 0  
103565525 
 
Credit Enhancements  
(CE) 
14813.36 2590.27 0 12312000 
 
Ratio of CE to SEC 0.384 0.006 0 3.678929766 
 
Exam Dummy 0.0557 0.003 0 1 










Chapter  Three: Sample Description for Multinomial Logit 
 
Table D1 
Sample Description – Multinomial Logit 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Loan Amount 1 47,625,000 171,593 223,690 
Income 1 9,999,000 92,942 123,662 
Loan Amount / 
Income 
0.00396 417 2.23 2.93 
MSA Median 
Home Price 
67,700 775,000 244,540 130,527 
Counts for Dummy Variables 
Non-owner 
occupied housing 
43966    
Refinance Loans 184164    
HOEPA 318    
Subordinate Lien 63816    
Unsecured Loans 4115    
FHA 12461    
  












 Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Fate of Loan Applications 
         







































































































































































































 N 338,283 
      
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient 





Sample Description and Results for Nested Logit 
 
TABLE E1 
Outcomes by Year for sample used in Nested Logit Regression 
2001-2006      
Deny 64221     
Originate 197648 Keep 80563   
  Sell 117085 Sell to GSE 62548 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 54537 
2001      
Deny 9055     
Originate 25571 Keep 11799   
  Sell 13772 Sell to GSE 9249 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 4523 
2002      
Deny 8255     
Originate 31795 Keep 12724   
  Sell 19071 Sell to GSE 12991 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 6080 
2003      
Deny 10833     
Originate 43960 Keep 15418   
  Sell 28542 Sell to GSE 18294 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 10248 
2004      
Deny 11240     
Originate 31041 Keep 12103   
  Sell 18938 Sell to GSE 8723 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 10215 
2005      
Deny 12410     
Originate 33926 Keep 14077   
  Sell 19849 Sell to GSE 7182 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 12667 
2006      
Deny 12428     
Originate 31355 Keep 14442   
  Sell 16913 Sell to GSE 6109 
    
 








Outcomes by Year for sample used in Nested Logit Regression (proportions) 
2001-2006     
Deny 24.5%     
Originate 75.5% Keep 40.8%   
  Sell 59.2% Sell to GSE 53.4% 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 46.6% 
2001      
Deny 26.2%     
Originate 73.8% Keep 46.1%   
  Sell 53.9% Sell to GSE 67.2% 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 
 32.8% 
2002      
Deny 20.6%     
Originate 79.4% Keep 40.0%   
  Sell 60.0% Sell to GSE 68.1% 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 31.9% 
2003      
Deny 19.8%     
Originate 80.2% Keep 35.1%   
  Sell 64.9% Sell to GSE 64.1% 
    
Sell to Private Inst. 
 35.9% 
2004      
Deny 26.6%     
Originate 73.4% Keep 39.0%   
  Sell 61.0% Sell to GSE 46.1% 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 53.9% 
2005      
Deny 26.8%     
Originate 73.2% Keep 41.5%   
  Sell 58.5% Sell to GSE 36.2% 
    
 
Sell to Private Inst. 
 63.8% 
2006      
Deny 28.4%     
Originate 71.6% Keep 46.1%   
  Sell 53.9% Sell to GSE 36.1% 
    
 










Results of Nested Logistic Regression for 2% Sample for Years 2001-2006 
 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 


























































































































































       
       
N 138504 169534 219172 169124 185344 175132 











Conditional Probabilities of Selected Outcomes of the Nested Logit Regression 
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